MACV-SOG - Created in Vietnam still influences Special Forces today

As the US's involvement in Vietnam steadily grew with more conventional troops, so did it's secret war. To counter the Viet Cong's guerrilla campaign, supported by the North Vietnamese army (NVA), raging inside South Vietnam, the Pentagon established a highly secretive special operations organization in 1964.

The Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) was tasked with taking the fight to the enemy regardless of where they were. Cross-border operations in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam—where US troops weren't supposed to be—became SOG's specialty.

Composed of Green Berets, Navy SEALs, Recon Marines, Air Commandos, and their indigenous allies, SOG primarily conducted reconnaissance and direct action operations, such as ambushes, in South Vietnam and across the border.

Cross-border recon missions often led to epic gunfights, as the small SOG teams would be compromised and hunted down by devastatingly superior enemy forces. It was more common than not for a recon team to be extracted under fire and with their perimeter minutes, if not seconds, away from being overrun. "SOG operations hurt the NVA [and] impeded the shipment of supplies/soldiers south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail," John Stryker Meyer, a legendary SOG operator, told Insider. "There were also major intel coups. For example, Operation Tailwind, which saved the CIA in Thailand, produced troves of key NVA intel. 

There was also Bargewell, who found valuable intel on an NVA base camp despite having been shot in the chest," Meyer added, referring to Eldon Bargewell, who went on to be a renowned general and commander in the Army's Delta Force.

Just one day with SOG could produce a lifetime of stories. For Meyer, a veteran of two SOG deployments who has written about his hair-raising experiences, it was hard to pick the most notable moment. Despite a late-night and personal encounter with an NVA soldier in the field, Meyer's most memorable operation was when his recon team went against three NVA divisions — 30,000 men — Thanksgiving Day.

In the end, the US lost the war despite the herculean efforts of SOG and its contribution to the fight. "There were contributions that we never learned about. For example, we pulled off a few wiretaps [in the Ho Chi Minh Trail], but we never heard back from the CIA on results," Meyer said. "Getting honest answers from the Communists about SOG's impact is impossible, but you take a case like October 5, 1968, when Recon Team Alabama and its air assets were responsible for 9,000 enemy troops KIA or WIA—that had an impact on troops moving south."

As direct US involvement in the war shrank, SOG became less needed, and in 1972, it was deactivated. "Like anything else, politics interfered. Our command structure often had to fight to keep close air support units assigned to support SOG, such as the A-1 Skyraider support," Meyer said of why SOG wasn't kept after Vietnam.

But SOG alumni continued to serve, which would prove key for the future of US special-operations forces. Eight years after MACV-SOG was deactivated, the Pentagon was forced to create a similar organization. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was born after the failure to rescue the American hostages from Iran during Operation Eagle Claw.

Col. Charlie Beckwith, the founder of Delta Force and ground force commander during the mission, argued for a joint command that would bring together America's special operators. Beckwith had served in SOG and thus already had an idea of what such a command could look like, despite the enemy now being terrorists and not the NVA.

As a result, the Pentagon created US Special Operations Command, its subordinate service commands, and JSOC. JSOC contains the military's tier-one units and is considered a national strategic asset. Initially, Delta Force and SEAL Team 6, which were JSOC's counterterrorism direct-action units, were predominately manned with Vietnam veterans, several of whom had served in SOG.

Although the conditions under which JSOC was created were completely different from those in which SOG worked, they share lots of similarities. Both organizations are joint, meaning that their units came from across the military and not just from one service. Additionally, they focus on both covert and clandestine operations. They also share a close relationship with the intelligence community, often working directly for it, like on the Osama bin Laden raid, during which the SEAL Team 6 operators were nominally under CIA control.

There are divergences as well. A significant difference between the two organizations—and between the times in which they fought—is their relationship with risk. SOG leaders and operators didn't hesitate to take an extreme risk in their fight against the North Vietnamese. Indeed, several SOG operations could be considered suicidal.

Whether it was when a SOG team went after three NVA divisions or when a reinforced SOG company went deep into Laos to help the CIA, SOG operations were characterized by their high-risk level. That was reflected in SOG's 100% casualty rate, meaning every operator was either wounded, often multiple times, or killed.

Conversely, today there is a risk-averse culture, even in the most elite special-operations organizations. "You can't even enter the room if you carry a CONOP [concept of operations] similar to SOG's," a former Delta Force operator told Insider. "There is no way anyone would approve that today." "The SAR window plays a big part in that," the Delta operator said, referring to the military's requirement that troops — commandos or not — be within range of a search-and-rescue asset in case their mission goes south.

"But, to be fair, it's a very different environment. We aren't engaged in a major war like Vietnam, and our organizations are different. We're the national mission force. We can't afford the casualty rate these guys had." SOG operators agree with that view. "Every spec-ops operator I've met in recent years from today's conflicts all agree that many of the missions we ran would never be allowed today due to threat levels," Meyer added. In the end, policy limitations notwithstanding, JSOC is continuing SOG's special-operations legacy.

Article from The Business Insider

Lucien Conein, Legendary OSS, Special Forces and CIA Officer - Forgotten by the USASOC History Office?

The USASOC History Office caused quite a stir in the US Special Forces and Intelligence community with its eyebrow-raising article about OSS influence on Special Forces, published in Veritas in 2018. Troy Sacquety, author of this article, concluded that “a grossly disproportionate share of the pioneering influence” was incorrectly attributed to the OSS veterans who joined early Special Forces. Sacquety also noted - in no uncertain terms - that this erroneous conferment was the result of “disinformation and exaggeration by the active force and veteran associations”.

Sacquety’s research methodology was simple: by-name comparisons between the list of OSS personnel, against the rosters of personnel assigned between 1952 and 1954 to the SF Department at the Psychological Warfare Center and School (PWCS), the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG); officers assigned to the 77th SFG; and 99 SF-trained personnel sent to serve in Korea. The data revealed that only fourteen former OSS members were part of the early Special Forces (SF). Sacquety subsequently remarks that “the total number of former OSS veterans in SF was less than one percent of the total of 1,169 SF soldiers”.

David S. Maxwell, a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel, responded in Small Wars Journal by noting that rather than only assess the numbers of OSS members in early SF, USASOC History Office would “do a great service by reminding readers that today’s SF assessment and selection, organization (especially the ODA), training, doctrine, and most important the foundational mission of SF, unconventional warfare, are directly related to and descended from the OSS”. Maxwell was also right in remarking that USASOC History Office undermined its own argument by emphasizing that the five former OSS instructors (identified in the Veritas’ article), were the ones “who provided the most influence from their OSS experiences on the developing force”. Finally, Maxwell adds that there were at least fifteen - not fourteen - former OSS who served in SF from 1952 to 1954: USASOC History Office's list failed to include Robert McDowell, who served with the OSS in Yugoslavia.

One could argue about Sacquety’s conclusion whether OSS influence on SF is exaggerated or not, his quantitative analysis of the number of OSS veterans in early SF is interesting. However, what exactly constitutes “early SF”? Why did Sacquety’s limit the time period to 1952-1954? What if he had included 1955, 1956, or the late fifties - when SF was still in its “pioneering” phase? Would this have led to different research findings? The answer is “yes”.

One example of an OSS veteran who joined SF in 1956 - and is thus not included in the Veritas’ article - is the legendary CIA officer Lucien Conein (see photo at right). When Conein passed in 1998, major newspapers, worldwide, devoted obituaries. The Washington Post even included a photo of Conein - wearing a beret with an SF flash. Who was this Conein and what was his contribution to early SF?

Lucien Emile Conein was born on 29 November 1919 in Paris. He grew up in Kansas city, having been sent there at age five by his widowed mother to be raised by his World War I-bride aunt. He joined the U.S. army in 1939 but transferred to the French army - Conein had retained his French citizenship - at the outbreak of WW2. After the fall of France, he returned to the US and became part of the 143rd Field Artillery Regiment. In the spring and summer of 1943, Conein went through Officer Candidate School at Ft. Benning. In October that year, he volunteered for service with the OSS. Conein became a Jedburgh officer and was parachuted in occupied France in the late summer of 1944. After VE-Day, Conein was sent to French Indochina by the OSS and fought with guerrillas against Japanese forces.

In 1946 and 1947, Conein served in several (counter-)intelligence units but was eventually transferred to the CIA in 1948. Conein retained his military rank and position as a cover. In the early fifties, Conein was assigned to the Saigon Military Mission, which was headed by the renowned CIA officer Edward Lansdale - another former OSS officer. Among other things, Conein formed stay-behind groups that were to become operational when the Viet Minh would take over. In 1955, Conein returned stateside and served briefly in Washington. On 6 November 1956, the CIA officer was suddenly transferred to the 77th Special Forces, where he would stay until May 1959.

How did Conein, as a fulltime CIA officer, suddenly wind up with the 77th Special Forces Group? Conein himself clarified:

“I had been on detail to the OSS and the SSU, CIG [sic], and CIA since 1943, and there it was 1956. I had not had troop duty in the proper sense, so the Army informed me that if I wanted to get promoted from a major that I had to go back to school and I had to go and take troop duty. So in typical Army fashion they wanted me to get away from everything that has to do with the CIA or anything like a special operations or anything like that. I’ll be darned. My orders came up, I had to go to down and take the advanced course at Fort Benning, which I had not taken. Then I was assigned to the 77th Special Forces Group. I said “What?”. They got me out of what I’m doing so that I wouldn’t do this anymore and do strictly military and here I’m going to play hide the weinie with troops with green beanies on their heads”.

According to the Veritas’ article ‘Training the Trainers’ (2009) Conein was one of four senior officers who was recruited by SF in the second half of the fifties “to get the 77th SFG up to the standard”. Experienced officers were needed because the Special Forces “could not perform their primary wartime mission”. Conein, together with his new colleagues, was to “add impetus to a soon to be established accelerated training program”.

Major Conein soon acted as project officer of the Basic Free Fall Parachuting Course and became the first officer in charge of Military Free Fall training within the Special Warfare Center. In 1958, Conein became Commanding Officer of Detachment FC-2. Later that year, he commanded Detachment FC-1. Conein’s last duty in Fort Bragg was Assistant Group Executive Officer for HQ Company 77th Special Forces Group. Later, Conein returned to Vietnam for the CIA - now in the rank of lieutenant colonel - and was appointed by Henry Cabot Lodge (President Kennedy's ambassador to Vietnam) as liaison with the generals that plotted the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem. Conein retired from the CIA in 1968 and ended his career with the Drug Enforcement Agency.

The above has shown that Lucien Conein - former OSS officer - was a senior figure within early SF. His contribution to SF should not have been overlooked by USASOC History Office. When OSS veterans such as Conein and McDowell have been omitted by USASOC History Office, the following question arises: who else is not included? Let’s hope this article “adds impetus” to a more thorough analysis of former OSS personnel that served with the Special Forces.

This article was written by Jelle Hooiveld, who is a PhD Candidate of Military History at Leiden University (The Netherlands), a Security & Intelligence Lecturer/Adviser, and the author of two books about Dutch Jedburgh teams.

Posted on the Small Wars Journal

Green Berets train Polish, Latvian resistance units in West Virginia

U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers completed the first irregular and unconventional warfare training iteration for members of the Polish Territorial Defense Forces and Latvian Zemmessardze as a part of the Ridge Runner program in West Virginia, according to service officials. The Green Berets, who are with 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group and the West Virginia Army National Guard, use the Ridge Runner exercise to offer U.S. troops and NATO allied forces training in asymmetrical warfare.

This summer, Latvia and Poland traveled to West Virginia for the program. Both nations have newly invigorated homeland defense forces capable of pushing back against an invading force and opposing a potential occupation. The units are trained to provide response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. Their tasks could include slowing the advancing units of an aggressor nation by destroying key transportation infrastructure such as bridges, attacking enemy forces at choke points and potentially serving as forward observers for NATO aircraft responding with airstrikes.

Polish Territorial Defense Forces, for instance, typically have a role similar to that of the U.S. National Guard, supporting local communities and acting as a reserve base for conventional forces. “Here at Ridge Runner, we developed skills beyond that,” said Marek Zaluski, a public information officer for the Polish troops, in an Army news release. "We’ve learned how to work with Special Forces, serve as liaisons, how to speak the same language, have the interoperability and cooperation.”

U.S. special operations forces have been training more with allies from the Baltic states and other Eastern European nations in the wake of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. A low-level conflict continues to simmer in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region between Russian-backed separatists and government forces to this day. The conflict spurred the Baltics into action, as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia embraced the concepts of total defense and unconventional warfare, combining active-duty, national guard and reserve-styled forces to each take on different missions to resist Russian aggression and even occupation. Poland similarly established its Territorial Defense Forces in 2017 to address homeland integrity concerns and tensions with Russia.

To solidify those gains, the U.S. military should provide more advanced equipment, help to develop resistance plans, build fusion centers for intelligence collection and counter Russian disinformation and cyber warfare, according to Stephen J. Flanagan, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation who co-authored a study on deterring Russian aggression for the Pentagon. “Our general assessment is we don’t believe, and many of the Baltic leaders don’t believe, that the Russians would make a land grab and sue for peace,” Flanagan told Army Times in April. “But they are opportunistic. If they think they can cause a crisis in NATO and make NATO look feckless or unable to respond quickly, that may be something they would risk.”

Interoperability between U.S. troops and European forces would be critical in the event of an attack on a NATO ally. Troops would need to share tactics, use similar terms and phrases over the radio waves and understand the flow of calling in close-air support in order to cooperate on the battlefield. Even when partner forces can speak English exceptionally well, they may not be familiar with American military jargon until they train with U.S. troops and bring those terms back to their home units.

“The soldiers who came with us for this exercise were specifically handpicked from a larger group because they represent the skills needed to operate with the Special Forces community as liaisons, pathfinders, and as people who are the points of contact in case of an unconventional warfare situation," Zaluski said in the release. The Ridge Runner program taps into roughly 500,000 acres of public and private land in West Virginia.

The training incorporates local government, law enforcement, emergency services and has utilized fixed wing and rotary aircraft in past exercises. “The conclusion of this Ridge Runner training is an exceptionally important milestone for both West Virginia and our allies in Poland and Latvia, who we have a longstanding relationship within our state through the State Partnership Programs with the Illinois and Michigan National Guards,” said West Virginia National Guard Adjutant General Maj. Gen. James Hoyer, in the release.

The State Partnership Program is administered by the National Guard Bureau with the Defense Department and State Department’s policy goals in mind. The initiative links state Guard units with partner countries for various training opportunities in the continental United States and overseas. The Illinois National Guard, for instance, is partnered with Poland, while the Michigan National Guard is partnered with Latvia. “West Virginia is the perfect venue for our highly trained special forces to help these two nations’ military forces develop the skills vital to their mission at home, which is extraordinarily important in this era of geo-political uncertainty," Hoyer added.

Article from the Army Times

Unconventional Warfare Revisited

This article was published on Small Wars Journal, authored by George Schwartz, a Combat Arms officer, veteran of small wars, and a student of Unconventional Warfare. He has served in the Army in various roles for 12 years.




Unconventional Warfare: Think Outside the G-Base

The Green Berets are in danger of self-inflicted irrelevancy because of shortcomings in their training. Most current Unconventional Warfare (UW) training events take the Unconventional Warfare template from Robin Sage and simply impose it on other environments and threat situations. This trend has persisted despite the lack of modern UW examples that resemble Robin Sage. Green Berets should be considering other models of UW that may be more relevant today.

Special Forces doctrine depicts resistance partner forces as having three elements: a rural-based full-time paramilitary guerrilla force, an urban-based underground, and an auxiliary that serves as the link between the two. The ODA partners with the guerrilla force and teaches them US-style small unit tactics. That is what every Green Beret did in Robin Sage. It is the common understanding of UW shared by all SF Soldiers. Virtually every UW exercise I have taken part in (Cobra Gold, Foal Eagle, Jade Helm, home station UW mission profiles) mirrors this model. That is what I mean by the “Robin Sage” model.

Our doctrine, as depicted by the Robin Sage model, reflects what some UW missions have looked like in the past. But our doctrine is just that: our doctrine. It does not describe every resistance movement or UW operation. Not all resistance movements conform to it. Resistance movements and UW exist all over the world, carried out by various powers, and very few of those resistance/UW models resemble our doctrine. The Iraqi insurgency, Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2014, and the subsequent Russian-sponsored UW in the Crimea do not. Neither does Hezbollah. We conducted UW against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and that did not look much like Robin Sage. Rather than re-fight Robin Sage, we should look at current insurgencies (or try to envision future insurgencies), think of how we would partner with them, and let that guide our training.

Recent UW models seem to fall into two broad categories: 1) the resistance force is already capable of taking and holding terrain against the opposing regime/occupying force, 2) the resistance force is underground. For examples of Category 1 resistance forces, we have the Northern Alliance in 2001, the Peshmerga in northern Iraq in 2003, the Crimean separatists today, or the anti-ISIS forces we worked with in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. UW partnership with such a force often looks a lot like a JCET or a CNT, where we train our partner force in a secure location, then send them forward or accompany them to fight against our common enemies. Preparing for such a mission would be very similar to JCET prep: identify the skills the partner force needs, prepare ourselves to train those skills, provide the training, and continually evaluate to make sure we are having the desired effect. Conducting regular JCETs and CNTs has made Special Forces adequately trained, equipped, and experienced to conduct this type of operation.

Category 2 is where the Robin Sage model of the rural-based full-time guerrilla force breaks down. Surveillance technology is so advanced and readily available that a semi-permanent G-base could easily be detected by a flying Cessna or Huey and a spotter with a commercially available thermal scope. Virtually all state actors can (and do) field that level of ISR. Also, most rural terrain (with the exception of triple-canopy jungle and similarly dense forest) still favors, on balance, large conventional force maneuver. These two facts combined mean the Robin Sage model is not viable in very many rural areas. A state actor with rudimentary commercially available surveillance tech would be able to find a large group of guerrillas and SF troops if they have air superiority, or even if the air space is contested. If the state actor retains freedom of maneuver and has the capacity to field a company of infantry or mass indirect fires, that G-band could easily be cut off and destroyed, together with its advisors. So the Robin Sage model is not practical unless the US already has air superiority and the enemy cannot field large conventional forces anymore. In other words, it is only useful after it is unnecessary.

Furthermore, our doctrine does not provide an all-encompassing picture of resistance forces. There may not be a clear distinction between underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas. The resistance force may look like a guerrilla force with auxiliary-like capabilities or an underground with guerrilla-like capabilities, much like insurgent cells in Iraq. Or it might not have any paramilitary component at all, like the Orange Revolution in 2014. The paradigm of teaching small unit tactics may not be relevant to partnering with a resistance force. Teaching US-style small unit tactics just makes the resistance force more symmetrical with their conventional opponent. And if there is no G-Force, as is the case in many resistance groups, small unit tactics are irrelevant. It is essential to recognize that SF doctrine does not describe resistance organization accurately and completely.

It is still possible to operate in rural terrain and to partner with resistance forces that do not conform to our doctrine, but it does require thinking outside of the Robin Sage-style static G-base. In rural terrain, Special Forces should use mobile G-bases, much as the FARC has done. In this model, the guerrillas and their ODA advisors would move whenever they can while avoiding detection. Properly executed, frequent movement can decrease the UW force’s profile and mitigate the threat of surveillance. Training for mobile G-bases is a lot harder because it requires a large training area and it is more physically demanding. However, it is more survivable. Emphasizing land navigation, tactical movements by day and night, as well as patrol base/RON site occupation and rural camouflage (particularly how to evade thermals) can support UW tactics of this kind.

Alternatively, the resistance force may choose to operate in urban terrain simply because urban terrain on balance strongly favors small units and guerrilla tactics over large conventional forces. Case in point- the Iraqi insurgents used urban terrain very effectively as long as they avoided decisive engagement. Another advantage to urban terrain is that it provides natural camouflage for communication systems. It is not impossible for an ODA to do UW in urban terrain: the Iranian Quds force did just that to us in Iraq. But urban UW comes with its own set of requirements. The UW force would need a network of safe houses and a mobility system to avoid getting pinned down. In this model, the urban guerrillas would go about their day jobs, then meet up with the ODA at predetermined places and times to receive training on how to take on specific objectives and exchange intelligence with the ODA. For skills that would enable this type of UW, SF should conduct urban evasion training, urban land navigation, and urban tactical movement.

Another possibility is an urban-rural hybrid. It is not necessary for the ODA and the resistance force to be co-located. The guerrilla force could be urban-based while the ODA that stays mobile in rural areas. In this case, the ODA would not be dependent on resistance safe houses, and the rural areas can furnish lots of space to train their resistance force. The ODA would need to have adequate infrastructure to support its mobility (patrol base sites, routes, training sites, communication sites, etc). The resistance force would maintain its daily life while the ODA maintained its tactical posture, then they would conduct linkup for training or operations. They could remain dispersed to maintain a low profile until they mass at the decisive moment. It may not even be necessary for the UW force to physically enter the operational area. ISIS used a decentralized form of UW to recruit, train, and employ terrorists through cyberspace.

In all of these possibilities, the resistance force may not resemble our doctrine at all. In time of invasion or rebellion, social structures that existed before conflict may still exist after the conflict, but take on a different character. For instance, the Bowling League is still the Bowling League, and its members still have their day jobs, but on the weekend they get together to destroy an enemy checkpoint or ambush a police patrol. That is very different from the doctrinal vision of the full-time G-force, but it is no less plausible.

Alternatively there may not be a need for G-force at all. In such a case, the ODA should not necessarily attempt to stand one up: the Green Beret’s job is not to get the resistance force to comply with our doctrine. Rather, one of the best capabilities an ODA can provide is a link to the outside world and the international community. Advice in how to stage demonstrations and protests and how to produce and broadcast propaganda can be more important than having an element capable of carrying out paramilitary operations and executing small unit tactics. Training in Information Operations and video editing could be the most useful skills in this situation, especially if the ODA cannot get any PsyOps enablers, or if those PsyOps enablers are inadequate.

Instead of teaching US small unit tactics and making the resistance for more symmetric to its enemy, the ODA should instead emphasize training that accomplishes US goals while increasing the asymmetric advantages of its resistance partner force. If the US goal is simply to disrupt the enemy regime or occupying power, the ODA could accomplish this by sabotaging enemy personnel and equipment. In that case, the ODA may need to teach its resistance partners how to conduct simple sabotage- how to destroy a vehicle with materials at hand, how to build and employ a Molotov cocktail, how to neutralize a power relay or a communications tower. Instead of co-locating with the G-band long-term, the ODA could linkup with the G-band only when necessary and give them the training the need to execute their next target. So rather than practicing Battle Drill 1A, the UW force would spend time rehearsing actions on objective and training on the skills needed to take that objective down.

Currently, the Green Berets are undoubtedly capable of conducting UW from secure bases in semi-permissive areas with air superiority. They did that effectively against ISIS, and they practice how to do that with every JCET, CNT, and UW exercise. Whether they are capable of conducting UW outside those conditions is questionable. The Robin Sage model that they are practicing is probably not survivable in a denied environment, let alone against a peer adversary. The resistance organizations they are training to partner with do not resemble current resistance movements. Current Special Forces team leadership should be asking: if your team had to partner with the Orange Revolution, or with an organization like Jaish al-Mahdi, would it even be capable of doing so? If so, what skills make that possible? If not, how has your training failed you, and what needs to happen to make it possible? Guerrilla bases like the ones we all saw in Robin Sage are increasingly rare in modern resistance movements. If that is all we know how to do, we will march into irrelevance. It is time to think outside the G-base and train to partner with modern resistance movements.

Army accepts first women to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection

Two female Army officers will make history when they report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in their first step toward earning the Special Forces tab and becoming Green Berets. The female officers, whom Army officials declined to identify, could attend their first Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) class as early as October, though neither has yet received orders for training at Fort Bragg, The Washington Times has learned.

Col. Nestor A. Sadler, commandant of the Special Forces Regiment at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center School at Fort Bragg, confirmed that the two female candidates had accepted invitations for the SFAS class. “Two females met the requirements for SFAS and were nominated by the ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces selection] panel to attend SFAS. One candidate declined her invitation and withdrew from the process. Special Forces Branch asked why. On the last day to accept or decline the invitation, she changed her mind and accepted the invitation to attend SFAS,” Col. Sadler said.

At a recent Special Forces Association conference in Jacksonville, Col. Sadler said that the Army selection panel had reviewed the application packets of seven female officers. Of those, two were approved for the SFAS class, he said.

Officers may apply for special forces positions once a year. The Army selection panel in April reviewed application packets from 860 officers for the three Special Operations Regiments, which include Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP. Maj. Melody Faulkenberry, spokeswoman for the Special Warfare Center and School, said that 71 women applied for the various Special Operations Regiments forces positions, and 65 were selected for consideration.

“This was the first time females had the ability to choose Special Forces, and nine female officers marked Special Forces as their first choice in their packets,” Maj. Faulkenberry said.

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter opened all combat occupations to women in December, ending a ban on women in direct ground combat roles.

The female officers must pass the SFAS and the subsequent Special Forces Qualification Course before earning the coveted green beret.

Both female officers are on active duty and have served in combat support roles. Neither attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. One received her commission via ROTC, the other via Officer Candidate School.

Citing the Privacy Act, Army officials declined Freedom of Information Act requests for the officers’ service background information such as their military occupation specialties, awards and deployment history.

“An important thing to remember is, these are volunteers. Special Forces is something soldiers volunteer for,” Maj. Faulkenberry said.

The two female officers are “triple volunteers,” having volunteered for the Army, airborne training and now Special Forces, she said.

In announcing an end to the military’s ban on women in direct combat roles on Dec. 3, Mr. Carter said that some military occupational specialties will likely have few women, noting the physical differences between the sexes.

“Thus far, we’ve only seen small numbers of women qualified to meet our high physical standards in some of our most physically demanding combat occupational specialties, and going forward, we shouldn’t be surprised if these small numbers are also reflected in areas like recruitment, voluntary assignment, retention and advancement in some of these specific specialties,” he said.

So far, no female officer has been able to complete the Marine Corps’ Infantry Officer Course in order to join the ground combat force. Three female soldiers have completed the Army’s Ranger School but not the qualification for the special operations Ranger regiment.

Maj. Faulkenberry said that the two female officers and 338 male officers aiming to join Special Forces first must complete the grueling, weeding-out process of Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFA), which last 21 days.

“It’s a challenging and scientifically based process that allows the regiment to predict a candidate’s ability to succeed in the intensive training that’ll follow, as well as operate in a team environment,” the major said.

Retired Col. David Maxwell, who commanded Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, said the SFAS is “built on lessons learned dating back to World War II and Office of Strategic Services [OSS] selection.”

“The OSS is the predecessor to today’s CIA and, of historical note, women went through OSS selection and training,” said Mr. Maxwell, who is now the associate director for the Center for Security Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

According to the course description, the SFAS cadre evaluates each candidate on eight core Army Special Operations Forces values or “attributes”: integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, adaptability, being a team player and capability. Unique tests push each candidate’s strengths, determination, intelligence and willpower to the limit.

“SFAS tests the candidates on those attributes under extremely stressful conditions. We’re looking to see what they’re made of,” Maj. Faulkenberry said.

Article from the Washington Times, 22 July 2016

Green Berets honored with Silver Star and eight other valor awards

As the bullets rained down around him, Staff Sgt. Michael Sargent dragged a fallen Afghan soldier to safety. Then, without hesitation or concern about his own safety, the Green Beret entered the courtyard in southern Afghanistan again to recover the body of a second fallen Afghan soldier and help a wounded teammate get to cover.

For his actions on that day in December, Sargent was awarded the Silver Star, the nation’s third-highest award for valor. Sargent and several other members of A Company, 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group were honored last Friday for their actions during their recent deployment to Afghanistan. 

In all, the soldiers earned the Silver Star, two Bronze Stars with V device, six Army Commendation Medals with V device, and one Purple Heart. “These men are heroes, plain and simple,” said Maj. Gen. Bret Daugherty, adjutant general of the Washington National Guard, during the ceremony, according to information released by the Army. “They don’t boast. They don’t draw undue attention to themselves. They just get the job done.”

The men of A Company deployed to Afghanistan in July, and they were tasked with developing and partnering with members of the Afghan National Security Forces. Their teammate, Sgt. 1st Class Matthew McClintock, 30, was killed Jan. 5 in hours-long fighting near the city of Marjah, in Afghanistan’s Helmand province. McClintock was posthumously promoted and awarded the Silver Star for his actions on that day; McClintock’s wife, Alexandra, has said her husband’s teammates told her he left a compound, under fire, to find a new landing zone so a helicopter could land and evacuate a wounded teammate.

Many of the awards presented last week were to McClintock’s teammates for their actions during that same battle. “The men we honored today, including those who were unable to be with us, represent the best of what is inside all of those who serve this great nation,” said Maj. Aron Horiel, commander of A Company, according to the Army. “It is truly an honor and a privilege to be their commander.”

Sargent, a Special Forces engineer sergeant, was awarded the Silver Star for his actions on Dec. 17. On that day, Sargent was an assault team leader during a clearing operation in Khan Neshin Valley in Helmand province, according to the narrative accompanying his award. Early that morning, Sargent and his fellow Green Berets were accompanying a team of Afghan commandos as they entered a courtyard adjacent to their objective, according to the narrative. A brief firefight broke out, and two Afghan soldiers were killed.

The remaining commandos reported back to their Green Beret mentors. Initial reports were unclear if the two Afghan casualties were killed or wounded, but the Afghans informed the Americans that the courtyard was clear, according to the narrative.

Sargent and three others entered the courtyard to help recover the two Afghan soldiers. After confirming the two men were dead, “the element came under intense automatic weapons fire at very close range from firing positions in a structure adjacent to the courtyard,” according to the narrative.

Two Americans were wounded in the initial burst of fire. That left Sargent and another soldier alone in the courtyard, according to the narrative. “With total disregard for his safety, SSG Sargent moved to the casualty closest to his position, retrieved the body and dragged the deceased [Afghan] soldier out of the courtyard under a hail of gunfire,” the narrative says. “Upon exiting the courtyard to relative safety, SSG Sargent returned into the courtyard without hesitation and recovered the second body and aided the remaining teammate still under fire.”

During this time, a fire to the structure containing the enemy firing position began to burn, setting off “large secondary explosions,” according to the narrative. “Again with total disregard for his safety, SSG Sargent moved through intense enemy fire and secondary explosions and employed two hand grenades into the fighting position to cover the withdrawal of his team members,” the narrative says.

When the enemy tried to “assault out of the fighting positions,” Sargent and his remaining teammate killed five of them, according to the narrative. Sargent “distinguished himself by exceptional heroism,” and “his actions proved critical in achieving relative superiority over determined enemy forces,” Sargent’s Silver Star citation reads.

Article from Army Times, 6 May 2016

5th Special Forces Group reverts to Vietnam-era beret flash

The Green Berets of the 5th Special Forces Group are now wearing the original 5th Special Forces Group Vietnam era flash on their berets as the 5th Special Forces Group honored its past Wednesday 23 March 2016, when the unit reverted to its Vietnam-era beret flash.

That flash is black with yellow and red stripes - see picture at right. It replaces the black shield the unit has used in more recent years. The yellow and red stripes pay homage to the 1st and 7th Special Forces Groups, which predated the 5th Group in Vietnam. The design also is similar to the flag used by South Vietnam forces.

The ceremony at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was attended by former members of the 5th Special Forces Group, including Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley. The group was based at Fort Bragg for much of its history, moving to Kentucky in 1988.

Col. Kevin C. Leahy, commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, said returning to the historical flash honors those who were lost or served in Vietnam and recognizes the nation's first mass deployment of Special Forces troops. "Today we lose nothing but gain a little bit of our own history," he said.

The beret flash is a symbol of the unit, worn over the left eye. Vietnam veterans delivered the new, old flash to current Special Forces soldiers, then stood in formation with them as they donned their berets. Milley, who tossed off his own camouflage cap for a Green Beret, called it an "incredible day" and said he was proud of the group that has always been "populated by heroes."

Green Berets Surrounded in Southern Afghanistan

The following article is from SOFREP, published under the title "Washington Policy Leaves Special Forces Soldiers Flapping in the Breeze in Marjah, Afghanistan".

It took so long to launch the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to help out Green Berets pinned down and under fire in Marjah, Afghanistan that it would have been faster to deploy a team from another continent rather than wait for the theater commanders in Afghanistan to let a nearby Special Forces team go to help their team mates.

With a team from 19th Special Forces Group attached to 3rd Special Forces Group surrounded and under fire in Marjah, Afghanistan their QRF should have been launched far sooner. It wasn’t the fault of the actual soldiers, who were standing by and ready to go, but command would not let them leave their base, insisting that they wait for the next period of darkness before a team from 19th Special Forces Group was able to drive in and conduct a off-set infil to support their fellow Green Berets.

The 19th Group Team was there as part of a broader effort to re-take Marjah from the Taliban, and was coordinated with local Afghan units which were clearing adjacent valleys. Once pinned down, one team member was killed, another seriously injured. A Special Forces medic (18D) worked on the casualty for 12-hours, keeping him alive while receiving enemy fire. The casualty, “was alert and oriented” by the time he was finally evacuated according to one SOFREP source.

The Green Beret KIA was SSG Matthew McClintock, 30, of Albuquerque, New Mexico (picture at right with his son). SSG McClintock also leaves behind a wife. "SSG McClintock was one of the best of the best," said MG Bret Daughtery, Commander of the Washington National Guard. McClintock was assigned to the 19th SFG, Washington National Guard. "He was a SF engineer, or 18C. Our condolences and prayers from go out the to the family of this Fallen Hero. May he Rest In peace."

Worse yet, command would not authorize fire support from a circling AC-130 gunship due to fears of collateral damage. Recent events such as the hospital bombing in Kunduz probably resonate at command levels, but perhaps they should have been thinking more about another recent event, Benghazi, since their men on the ground faced the threat of being overrun. Eventually, the command allowed AC-130 to fire a whopping two 40mm rounds into an open field a weak show of force to the Taliban.

3rd Group Green Berets have often complained about the leadership failures experienced while in theater in Afghanistan. Part of the problem is that they end up working for NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). “We have so many fucking Generals that don’t do shit,” one Special Forces soldier said in disgust. “Every base I go to I trip over 50 majors, 30 LTCs, and see 6 Generals.” Entire advisory teams and separate military commands are invented in Afghanistan simply so that officers can be deployed and hold a “command” which will get them promoted.

One spot of good news is that the Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan National Army (ANA) Special Forces, and Afghan Commandos have turned out to be strong allies in fighting the Taliban. “They are really doing their job…but you won’t read that in the news,” a Green Beret told SOFREP.

"Ex"-Green Beret Mathew Golsteyn Likely to Receive a General Discharge

"Ex"-Green Beret Mathew Golsteyn should receive general discharge An Army board of inquiry has recommended a general discharge for a decorated former Green Beret, finding no clear evidence the soldier violated the rules of engagement while deployed to Afghanistan in 2010.

Maj. Mathew Golsteyn, accused by the Army of illegally killing an unarmed, suspected bomb-maker, would retain most of his retirement benefit under a recommended general discharge under honorable conditions. While cleared of a law of armed conflict violation, the board did determine his conduct was unbecoming.

The government had sought an other-than-honorable discharge. Golsteyn's lawyer Phillip Stackhouse called the Army's ruling "deficient" and said Golsteyn would appeal. The government, he said, did not specify or work to substantiate any unbecoming behavior separate from the alleged law of armed conflict violation. In other words, the board made two different decisions for the same alleged conduct.

"It makes no sense. It's a defective finding." Stackhouse told Army Times. "They nicked him for conduct unbecoming with no specific findings."

The board members, Col. Stuart Goldsmith, Lt. Col. Angela Greenewald and Lt. Col. James Bekurs , were not required to explain their decision. Capt. Jason McKenna, a judge advocate who presented the government's case, deferred to Army Special Forces Command (Airborne).

Army Secretary John McHugh, who already stripped Golsteyn of a Silver Star and his Special Forces Tab, will decide whether to accept the board of inquiry's recommendation. Regulations dictate he can only act more favorably to Golsteyn than the general discharge prescribed by the panel, Stackhouse said.

Army Times sought a response from McHugh and received the following from Army spokesman Lt. Col. Ben Garrett:

"The results of the Board of Inquiry will be reviewed by the General Officer Show Cause Authority and the Army Review Boards Agency. As such, it would be inappropriate to comment on the results of the Board or the substance of the evidence considered by the Board," Garrett said.

Stackhouse said the appeal will be filed after the full transcript of the hearing is assembled, which could take over a month. In the meantime, he said, Golsteyn's discharge will proceed in parallel to the medical board process in determining the specifics of retirement benefits.

Stackhouse said Golsteyn remains unavailable for interviews, but did say that his client felt betrayed by the Army over the past few years.

"It's very fair to say he feels betrayed. We talked about that today. I also think that he feels vindicated by the testimony that has been presented: that there was witness after witness after witness after witness that testified to his moral courage, his decision-making and his character," Stackhouse said.

All along, Stackhouse and other Golsteyn supporters have maintained the Army investigation failed to find any corroboration of the allegation, which stemmed from Golsteyn's video-taped polygraph during a 2011 job interview with the CIA.

No physical evidence was found in the Army investigation (of which the Army Times acquired a redacted version). Golsteyn allegedly admitted in the videotaped interview with the CIA that he shot, buried, dug up and burned the body of the victim after the victim identified and threatened an Afghan informant.

However, tests of multiple burn pits came up negative for human remains, according to the investigation. Witnesses also provided no corroboration to the allegation, and most also effused praise for Golsteyn's character and capabilities. One member of the task force commanded by Golsteyn said: "Myself and pretty much anyone on our team would walk through fire for him." In the most negative statement, the investigator documented a major saying "Maj. Golsteyn was Type-A personality and could be very aggressive at times," though he knew nothing of any criminal or negligent activity.

Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., a McHugh critic and Golsteyn advocate, said in a statement that the hearing indicated troubling Army investigative procedures from "an investigator who intentionally misrepresented the body of evidence to gain certain access, to information that was incorrectly referenced and transcribed in the investigation, to a last minute decision to admit evidence that was earlier determined to be inadmissible." He said he intended to continue to pursue the restoration of Golsteyn's awards "through any and all means available."

Stackhouse expects his client will receive a high disability rating, with issues ranging from post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury, back issues and a heart issue stemming from Special Forces training. He noted that while Golsteyn's Special Forces tab was stripped, he remained a Special Forces officer, as the Army never transferred him to a different branch.

Article from Army Times

http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/crime/2015/06/29/board-ex-green-beret-mathew-golsteyn-should-receive-general-discharge/29477523/

5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Iraq

This is a good short video capturing some of the actions that the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) did in over 10 years of operations in Iraq.

Wounded Warrior Maj. Ivan Castro - Retirement Won't Slow Him Down

It wasn't easy, but after Ivan Castro was blinded by a blast in Iraq in 2006, he fought to stay in the Army.

A major serving within U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Castro has tried to be an inspiration for others like him by showing that his injuries can't stop his drive to succeed. Since losing his sight, Castro has run 50 marathons, climbed mountains, cycled across the continental United States and, last year, trekked to the South Pole alongside Great Britain's Prince Harry.

Now Castro's military career is coming to an end, but that doesn't mean he's taking a back seat in his quest to inspire and help others. or the second year, Castro will host the Special Operators Challenge at the Carolina Horse Park near Raeford. The May 30 event, which will feature a children's race and 5k and 10k obstacle course races, will raise money for seven nonprofit organizations.

Castro has bigger plans for his organization and his post-military career. He plans to form a foundation in addition to the group that puts on the challenge. He's working on a memoir with Jim DeFelice, the author who helped write Chris Kyle's autobiography that became the basis for the movie "American Sniper.''

And even though he's taking off the uniform, Castro wants to continue to be a spokesman for those coping with their own injuries and pass on the life lessons he's learned as a wounded warrior.

"I'm very blessed," Castro said. "It could have always been worse. I can't see, but in my eyes the grass is always green and the sun is always shining." "I don't have a disability, I have a limitation," he said. "I have been given a second chance at life. I want to continue to help and serve people."

The Special Operators Challenge will include three events.

The Little Muddy is a short race - with mile and half-mile options - for children. The Boomerang 5k is an obstacle run with the added challenge of integrating beers and bratwurst into the race. The Muddy Nick 10k is a rugged race filled with mud, dirt and water integrated into military-style obstacles.

The races attracted more than 800 competitors last year. This year, officials are not accepting same-day registration. Instead, competitors must register online at specialoperatorschallenge.com.

Registration fees go toward an organization of the competitor's choice from among a list that includes the Special Forces Charitable Trust; Team Red, White and Blue; the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation; the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund; Step Up For Soldiers; the Fayetteville Running Club and the Special Forces Association.

Castro said the organizations were chosen because of their ties to supporting American heroes. We're all about honoring those that serve," he said. "I want to give back."

Castro was injured while serving with the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq in September 2006. He lost his right eye and the vision in his left eye. After recovering at a military hospital, Castro fought to stay out of the Army's warrior transition units for fear that doing so would be the beginning of the end for his Army career. Castro wanted to fulfill the commitment he made when he transitioned from noncommissioned officer to officer.

Castro "did it all" as an enlisted soldier. He was a pathfinder, a Ranger, in a long-range surveillance unit and a Green Beret.

When he became an officer, he needed an age waiver, but he committed the next 10 years of his life to the Army in return. He then served in the 82nd Airborne Division up until his injuries, deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Castro was recently promoted to major, but he said finishing that commitment was his biggest success in his 26-year career. "Despite my blindness, I was able to do it," he said. "I made it. I never thought it would be possible."

It was in those first years after his injury that Castro set the stage for what will become his post-military life. In 2008, he was a race director for the annual Jingle Bell Jog, a race that benefits the families of fallen Special Forces soldiers. From that point on, Castro was hooked on the idea of creating a great event where competitors could challenge themselves while also helping others.

He became involved in other races. When he saw obstacle course races gaining popularity, he decided to create his own challenge along with his wife, Evelyn. The first challenge was mapped out at Castro's dining room table. Planning now takes place in an office on Breezewood Avenue.

In Castro's office, there are photographs from throughout his military career. Images of him with President George W. Bush and Queen Elizabeth II and a sword given to him by Ross Perot.

Castro said he hopes more than veterans will compete. "We wanted to do something that appeals to everybody," he said. "We want people to leave challenged, but have a good time."

Article from the Fayetteville (NC) Observer by Military editor Drew Brooks

COL James N. "Nick" Rowe, true American Hero

Today is the 26th anniversary of Nick Rowe's death by assassination by the New People's Army insurgent/terrorist organization in the Philippines. Unless you have been in hiding for the last 40 years, you should have an appreciation of what Nick Rowe did for Special Forces.

Rowe was a West Point graduate of 1960 and was subsequently commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Army. In 1963, then First Lieutenant Rowe was deployed to Vietnam as Executive Officer of Detachment A-23, 5th Special Forces Group. The mission of A-23 was to organized a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) for a basecamp in the Mekong Delta.

On October 29, 1963, Rowe was captured by Viet Cong elements along with Captain Rocky Versace and Sergeant Daniel Pitzer. Rowe spent 62 months in captivity in the U Minh Forest, most of this time in a cage. Over powering a guard, Rowe escaped captivity on December 31, 1968, and during evasion, managed to signal a Huey helicopter for recovery. Rowe subsequently wrote his account of captivity in the book Five Years to Freedom. Nick Rowe retired from active duty in 1974.

In 1981, He was recalled to active duty as a lieutenant colonel to develop a Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) course based upon his experience as a POW. The SERE course is now part of the required training for all Special Forces candidates in the multi-phased Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). This course is universally considered the best SERE course in the U.S. Military.

In 1987, Colonel Rowe was assigned to the U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines providing training and advisory capabilities to the Filipino Army fighting the New People's Army (NPA), the communist insurgency.

In February 1989, Colonel Rowe warned that the NPA was planning on assassinating several prominent figures, himself included. On April 21, 1989 Colonel Rowe was assassinated in an ambush on his vehicle while traveling to JUSMAG headquarters.

Not only just the developer and driving force between the US Army Special Forces SERE school, there are facilities in the Philippines, Fort Huachuca and Fort Campbell named after COL James. N. "Nick" Rowe.

 Camp MacKall, the Special Forces Training base at Fort Bragg was re-named the Rowe Training Facility. The infamous obstacle course that every Special Forces Candidates grew to hate is called the "Nasty Nick" and fittingly is called the hardest obstacle course in the military. And last, but not least, a High School and major Boulevard in Nick Rowe's hometown of McAllen are named after him. Special Forces and indeed this Country, owe a huge debt to this man.

American business needs the Green Berets

Excellent article from Quartz.com, under the title "American business needs the Green Berets", written by Colin James Nagy who is the Executive Director of The Barbarian Group, on why American businesses should hire Green Berets.

I’ve been working on a pro-bono strategy project lately with my colleague Laura Robertson. The purpose? Help Special Forces soldiers (aka the Green Berets) transition after their service into the business world. There are plenty of other non-profits and efforts aimed at helping veterans move out of the armed forces, but there’s an especially strong match between this elite community and the private sector business—if we can translate between the two.

We’ve spoken to a range of transitioning Green Berets—those who have successfully launched business careers, civilian recruiters, as well as the staff of charitable foundations focused on transition. We’ve also immersed ourselves in the training, culture, structures and most importantly, the type of thinking taught to members of the Special Forces regiment.

First off, we determined there’s a significant branding issue that the community faces. The Special Forces (often referred to as “SF”) community exclusively refers to the Army’s soldiers focused on unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, among other areas.

Other branches are grouped under the “Special Operations Forces” moniker (and include Navy SEALS, Air Force Para-rescue, Marine Force Recon, and several others). The two names are often confused, even by the likes of former secretary of defense and CIA director Leon Panetta in a 60 minutes segment.

However, due to the high visibility of these other groups, there’s a lack of understanding among the general public about what the SF community knows and brings to the table. US popular culture tends to focus on the direct action/door-kicking stuff of action films and slightly less on those with the skills of battlefield diplomacy and nuance.

This world is often less cut and dry, with more time spent on the ground and among communities. It’s less “get in and get out” as it is full-on immersion, teaching, living-by-wits and building networks. But these skills are undoubtedly why the Special Forces community are some of the strongest candidates to transition into the business world and make a big impact.

Our research and conversations unearthed a lot of useful information about how these individuals are taught to think and operate in highly uncertain situations.

According to Army recruiting information about SF:

SF, commonly referred to as Green Berets, are strategic, multipurpose forces capable of rapid response to various contingencies throughout the world. Their mission is to organize, train, equip, and direct indigenous forces in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

The roles are many, but one of their core competencies is linking up with foreign forces, training and instructing them, and accomplishing missions. As a lot of this is happening behind enemy lines, there’s a required level of cultural sensitivity, as well as the ability to operate with a tremendous amount of ambiguity. To lead without formal authority, nurture relationships, and conduct battlefield diplomacy in some of the meanest parts of the world raises the question of what these people could bring to a high performing business environment.

A veteran Special Forces NCO told us:

On missions you’re usually working with less than half the people you’re supposed to have. In Afghanistan, I was on a split team of 3 guys, isolated, in a really remote location. Our fuel and food were dropped in by a helicopter. My only connection to civilization was a radio. Yeah, you had to solve every problem on your own.

We also heard an anecdote from a transitioned SF officer, now working in finance, about how creative thinking saved the day in a less-than-ideal situation on a trip:

The Special Forces guy carved out this funnel out of this Coke can, after he recognized what the problem was […] and it worked awesome. And Joe [civilian business leader] nudges me with his elbow, ‘master problem solver.’ ‘Joe—would you hire that guy?’ ‘In a heartbeat.’

Throughout the selection process, from the arduous qualification (“Q”) course where they learn their specific specialties (comms, engineering, medical, etc) to their time on a team—or ODA (operational detachment)—SF soldiers are taught to hone attributes like teamwork, sacrifice, intellectual curiosity, cultural sensitivity, and communication. They also need to figure out how to solve problems without much direction and in highly uncertain circumstances.

They are charcoal filtered throughout this entire process, at each step honing the skills that will set them up for success post-Army.

In our conversations with CEOs and other senior executives, we heard the same refrain: “I want someone who can bring order to chaos and get the job done at all costs.”

A C-Suite member of a payments company told us: “One type of person I always like to hire is someone who’s an independent autodidact. All I want is someone who can just get the Message to Garcia.”

In other words, someone as self-directed and capable as a Green Beret.

So what are the obstacles to making this happen?

1.More understanding within the general public and business world about who the Green Berets are, and what they can offer when they get out.
2.Lack of understanding among civilian recruiters. We’ve found that CEO’s know (and want to work with) these people, but the initial, mid-level gatekeepers do not know enough, and need to be better educated.
3.The SF mindset and shared culture of humility means that team guys do not brag or take credit for things they’ve done. They are called “quiet professionals” for a reason. An admirable trait, but not always the best one to get you hired in a competitive market. SF soldiers need to be able to tell their stories and share their strengths in a way that is harmonious with corporate culture.

So, working closely with a new initiative called The Next Ridgeline, part of the Green Beret Foundation, we’ll partner to help educate the public on what these men can bring to the table—and why they’re so vital for the business world.

While all veterans have unique attributes to bring to the public sector, we believe that the characteristics of the SF soldier lend themselves well to various sectors of commerce—particularly high growth areas (and in some cases, startups).

As we were concluding our research, we were reminded of the earlier quote alluded to about the “Message to Garcia.” It is a passage from Elbert Hubbard that sums up the value proposition and reinforces why Green Berets can be the resourceful leaders American businesses need:

My heart goes out to the man who does his work when the “boss” is away as well as when he is at home. And the man who, when given a letter for García, quietly takes the missive, without asking any idiotic questions, and with no lurking intention of chucking it into the nearest sewer, or of doing aught else but deliver it, never gets “laid off,” nor has to go on a strike for higher wages. Civilization is one long, anxious search for just such individuals. Anything such a man asks shall be granted; his kind is so rare that no employer can afford to let him go. He is wanted in every city, town, and village—in every office, shop, store, and factory. The world cries out for such; he is needed, and needed badly—the man who can carry a message to García.

Green Berets: A complete video history

The United States Army Special Forces, also known as the Green Berets because of their distinctive service headgear, are a special operations force tasked with five primary missions: unconventional warfare (the original and most important mission of Special Forces), foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action and counter-terrorism.

The first two emphasize language, cultural and training skills in working with foreign troops. Other duties include hostage rescue, combat search and rescue (CSAR), security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian demining, counter-proliferation, psychological operations, manhunts, and counter-drug operations; other components of the United States Special Operations Command or other U.S. government activities may also specialize in these secondary areas.

Many of their operational techniques are classified, but some nonfiction works and doctrinal manuals are available. Currently Special Forces units are deployed in Operation Enduring Freedom.

As a special operations unit, Special Forces are not necessarily under the command authority of the ground commanders in those countries. Instead, while in theater, SF soldiers may report directly to United States Central Command, USSOCOM, or other command authorities.

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) highly secretive Special Activities Division (SAD) and more specifically its elite Special Operations Group (SOG) recruits soldiers from the Army's Special Forces.

Joint Army Special Forces and CIA operations go back to the famed MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War. This cooperation still exists today and is seen in the War in Afghanistan.