Unconventional Warfare Revisited

This article was published on Small Wars Journal, authored by George Schwartz, a Combat Arms officer, veteran of small wars, and a student of Unconventional Warfare. He has served in the Army in various roles for 12 years.




Unconventional Warfare: Think Outside the G-Base

The Green Berets are in danger of self-inflicted irrelevancy because of shortcomings in their training. Most current Unconventional Warfare (UW) training events take the Unconventional Warfare template from Robin Sage and simply impose it on other environments and threat situations. This trend has persisted despite the lack of modern UW examples that resemble Robin Sage. Green Berets should be considering other models of UW that may be more relevant today.

Special Forces doctrine depicts resistance partner forces as having three elements: a rural-based full-time paramilitary guerrilla force, an urban-based underground, and an auxiliary that serves as the link between the two. The ODA partners with the guerrilla force and teaches them US-style small unit tactics. That is what every Green Beret did in Robin Sage. It is the common understanding of UW shared by all SF Soldiers. Virtually every UW exercise I have taken part in (Cobra Gold, Foal Eagle, Jade Helm, home station UW mission profiles) mirrors this model. That is what I mean by the “Robin Sage” model.

Our doctrine, as depicted by the Robin Sage model, reflects what some UW missions have looked like in the past. But our doctrine is just that: our doctrine. It does not describe every resistance movement or UW operation. Not all resistance movements conform to it. Resistance movements and UW exist all over the world, carried out by various powers, and very few of those resistance/UW models resemble our doctrine. The Iraqi insurgency, Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2014, and the subsequent Russian-sponsored UW in the Crimea do not. Neither does Hezbollah. We conducted UW against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and that did not look much like Robin Sage. Rather than re-fight Robin Sage, we should look at current insurgencies (or try to envision future insurgencies), think of how we would partner with them, and let that guide our training.

Recent UW models seem to fall into two broad categories: 1) the resistance force is already capable of taking and holding terrain against the opposing regime/occupying force, 2) the resistance force is underground. For examples of Category 1 resistance forces, we have the Northern Alliance in 2001, the Peshmerga in northern Iraq in 2003, the Crimean separatists today, or the anti-ISIS forces we worked with in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. UW partnership with such a force often looks a lot like a JCET or a CNT, where we train our partner force in a secure location, then send them forward or accompany them to fight against our common enemies. Preparing for such a mission would be very similar to JCET prep: identify the skills the partner force needs, prepare ourselves to train those skills, provide the training, and continually evaluate to make sure we are having the desired effect. Conducting regular JCETs and CNTs has made Special Forces adequately trained, equipped, and experienced to conduct this type of operation.

Category 2 is where the Robin Sage model of the rural-based full-time guerrilla force breaks down. Surveillance technology is so advanced and readily available that a semi-permanent G-base could easily be detected by a flying Cessna or Huey and a spotter with a commercially available thermal scope. Virtually all state actors can (and do) field that level of ISR. Also, most rural terrain (with the exception of triple-canopy jungle and similarly dense forest) still favors, on balance, large conventional force maneuver. These two facts combined mean the Robin Sage model is not viable in very many rural areas. A state actor with rudimentary commercially available surveillance tech would be able to find a large group of guerrillas and SF troops if they have air superiority, or even if the air space is contested. If the state actor retains freedom of maneuver and has the capacity to field a company of infantry or mass indirect fires, that G-band could easily be cut off and destroyed, together with its advisors. So the Robin Sage model is not practical unless the US already has air superiority and the enemy cannot field large conventional forces anymore. In other words, it is only useful after it is unnecessary.

Furthermore, our doctrine does not provide an all-encompassing picture of resistance forces. There may not be a clear distinction between underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas. The resistance force may look like a guerrilla force with auxiliary-like capabilities or an underground with guerrilla-like capabilities, much like insurgent cells in Iraq. Or it might not have any paramilitary component at all, like the Orange Revolution in 2014. The paradigm of teaching small unit tactics may not be relevant to partnering with a resistance force. Teaching US-style small unit tactics just makes the resistance force more symmetrical with their conventional opponent. And if there is no G-Force, as is the case in many resistance groups, small unit tactics are irrelevant. It is essential to recognize that SF doctrine does not describe resistance organization accurately and completely.

It is still possible to operate in rural terrain and to partner with resistance forces that do not conform to our doctrine, but it does require thinking outside of the Robin Sage-style static G-base. In rural terrain, Special Forces should use mobile G-bases, much as the FARC has done. In this model, the guerrillas and their ODA advisors would move whenever they can while avoiding detection. Properly executed, frequent movement can decrease the UW force’s profile and mitigate the threat of surveillance. Training for mobile G-bases is a lot harder because it requires a large training area and it is more physically demanding. However, it is more survivable. Emphasizing land navigation, tactical movements by day and night, as well as patrol base/RON site occupation and rural camouflage (particularly how to evade thermals) can support UW tactics of this kind.

Alternatively, the resistance force may choose to operate in urban terrain simply because urban terrain on balance strongly favors small units and guerrilla tactics over large conventional forces. Case in point- the Iraqi insurgents used urban terrain very effectively as long as they avoided decisive engagement. Another advantage to urban terrain is that it provides natural camouflage for communication systems. It is not impossible for an ODA to do UW in urban terrain: the Iranian Quds force did just that to us in Iraq. But urban UW comes with its own set of requirements. The UW force would need a network of safe houses and a mobility system to avoid getting pinned down. In this model, the urban guerrillas would go about their day jobs, then meet up with the ODA at predetermined places and times to receive training on how to take on specific objectives and exchange intelligence with the ODA. For skills that would enable this type of UW, SF should conduct urban evasion training, urban land navigation, and urban tactical movement.

Another possibility is an urban-rural hybrid. It is not necessary for the ODA and the resistance force to be co-located. The guerrilla force could be urban-based while the ODA that stays mobile in rural areas. In this case, the ODA would not be dependent on resistance safe houses, and the rural areas can furnish lots of space to train their resistance force. The ODA would need to have adequate infrastructure to support its mobility (patrol base sites, routes, training sites, communication sites, etc). The resistance force would maintain its daily life while the ODA maintained its tactical posture, then they would conduct linkup for training or operations. They could remain dispersed to maintain a low profile until they mass at the decisive moment. It may not even be necessary for the UW force to physically enter the operational area. ISIS used a decentralized form of UW to recruit, train, and employ terrorists through cyberspace.

In all of these possibilities, the resistance force may not resemble our doctrine at all. In time of invasion or rebellion, social structures that existed before conflict may still exist after the conflict, but take on a different character. For instance, the Bowling League is still the Bowling League, and its members still have their day jobs, but on the weekend they get together to destroy an enemy checkpoint or ambush a police patrol. That is very different from the doctrinal vision of the full-time G-force, but it is no less plausible.

Alternatively there may not be a need for G-force at all. In such a case, the ODA should not necessarily attempt to stand one up: the Green Beret’s job is not to get the resistance force to comply with our doctrine. Rather, one of the best capabilities an ODA can provide is a link to the outside world and the international community. Advice in how to stage demonstrations and protests and how to produce and broadcast propaganda can be more important than having an element capable of carrying out paramilitary operations and executing small unit tactics. Training in Information Operations and video editing could be the most useful skills in this situation, especially if the ODA cannot get any PsyOps enablers, or if those PsyOps enablers are inadequate.

Instead of teaching US small unit tactics and making the resistance for more symmetric to its enemy, the ODA should instead emphasize training that accomplishes US goals while increasing the asymmetric advantages of its resistance partner force. If the US goal is simply to disrupt the enemy regime or occupying power, the ODA could accomplish this by sabotaging enemy personnel and equipment. In that case, the ODA may need to teach its resistance partners how to conduct simple sabotage- how to destroy a vehicle with materials at hand, how to build and employ a Molotov cocktail, how to neutralize a power relay or a communications tower. Instead of co-locating with the G-band long-term, the ODA could linkup with the G-band only when necessary and give them the training the need to execute their next target. So rather than practicing Battle Drill 1A, the UW force would spend time rehearsing actions on objective and training on the skills needed to take that objective down.

Currently, the Green Berets are undoubtedly capable of conducting UW from secure bases in semi-permissive areas with air superiority. They did that effectively against ISIS, and they practice how to do that with every JCET, CNT, and UW exercise. Whether they are capable of conducting UW outside those conditions is questionable. The Robin Sage model that they are practicing is probably not survivable in a denied environment, let alone against a peer adversary. The resistance organizations they are training to partner with do not resemble current resistance movements. Current Special Forces team leadership should be asking: if your team had to partner with the Orange Revolution, or with an organization like Jaish al-Mahdi, would it even be capable of doing so? If so, what skills make that possible? If not, how has your training failed you, and what needs to happen to make it possible? Guerrilla bases like the ones we all saw in Robin Sage are increasingly rare in modern resistance movements. If that is all we know how to do, we will march into irrelevance. It is time to think outside the G-base and train to partner with modern resistance movements.

Green Berets Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity

This article was written by David Walton and Joseph Long and published on the Small Wars Journal. Dr. Joseph Long is a retiring Green Beret officer and developing leadership scholar. He has conducted extensive research in understanding Guerrilla Leadership and the strategic impact of Unconventional Warfare. Dr. David Walton is a professor of national security strategy at the National Defense University. As a retired Green Beret officer with extensive operational experience in Latin America and the Middle East, his work and research focus on operationalizing great strategy for better results.

Green Berets Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity

Direct Action and Unconventional Warfare - one is in the movies, and the other is in the history books. Perhaps oversimplified, the differences between these two mission sets are at the heart of the Green Beret’s identity crisis. Both are clearly doctrinal Special Forces missions, but one dominates our cultural zeitgeist, while the other is relegated to a few weeks in the Q course and knowing glances at Semi-Annual Training Briefs. Nearly two decades at war have forced Special Forces into a corner. Special Forces has been so busy doing their job that they may have forgotten how to do their job. An entire generation of Green Berets has only known the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the following generation has been recruited on the promise of door-kicking raids, dynamic entries, and kill/capture methodologies. But the roots of Special Forces are in the OSS, not the GWOT. These resistance skills will atrophy, from the individual through the institutional levels, if not resurrected and revitalized for tomorrow’s conflicts. Guerilla Warfare is a perishable skill and left unexercised it will deteriorate. The popular aphorism that an ideal Green Beret is a Ph.D. who can win a bar fight may soon face the stark reality that Green Berets can only win bar fights. To help understand where Special Forces must go, it is important to understand how they got where they are today.

This change in cultural identity did not happen overnight. In the last decade and a half of counterinsurgency-based conflict in multiple theaters, special operations forces (SOF) have led the way in developing successful processes for conducting contemporary military operations. The success of SOF operations has arguably influenced United States (US) political and military leaders to the degree that SOF-like methods are being duplicated in conventional circles as a new way of war. Concepts such as multi-domain operations, regionally aligned forces (RAF) and Security Forces Assistance Brigades (SFAB) with language training and distinctive berets are but some examples of SOFs most recent influence on the American way of war.

However, the increasing influence of the SOF umbrella remains problematic for the Special Forces (SF) branch. Specifically, the use of the term SOF in the media has diluted the input of SF within the SOF enterprise resulting in a disjointed sense of identity in the SF Regiment. News outlets and influential media personalities often confuse the terms SOF and SF to dilute the significance of Special Forces operations against other SOF elements. Consequently, the dilution of the SF-specific identity is increasingly impacting the SF Regiment’s ability to recruit sufficient numbers to maintain the force. Given that SOF refers to all units in the unified US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is frequently couched as SF in the media, how can future SF members grasp the specifics of the SF mission? That said, the purpose of this paper is two-fold.

First, the authors endeavor to ignite a conversation within the SF Regiment about its enduring identity and to move toward clarity and union. Second, we propose a framing for the SF identity as a unique "triple threat" of skills that highlights distinctions of the SF branch from other SOF and conventional units, and the rebranding of the Special Forces branch as our most iconic and identifying term: Green Berets. This discussion serves only to emphasize the unique selling proposition that Green Berets maintain; it does not serve as a call for competition amongst SOF. The debate about who, what, when, where, and why the US conducts Unconventional Warfare is nearly endless. This discussion is the specifics of how, because only Green Berets are skilled in Guerilla Leadership. And therefore, even if the discussion of the specific future operating environment and accompanying mission set remains unclear, there is little doubt that the most critical Special Forces skillset resides in the ability to identify, analyze, and utilize human networks (Meredith, 2019). Whatever the mission this network-centric mindset is best incubated in the Unconventional Warfare petri dish.

Why Identity Matters

As an organization, identity matters. From a scholarly perspective, building and maintaining identity is a task that must be deliberate from senior leadership on down since it impacts organizational culture across multiple sub-fields. In leadership literature, identity is critical to developing organizational culture by combining the individual identity with social and organizational ones to create meaning for people within institutions (Alvesson, 2011). From a social movement perspective, collective identity is thought to be a critical component for mobilization and collective action (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Tarrow, 1994). It also plays a role in cross-cultural leadership to underscore relational aspects of identity through understanding divisive cleavages that can prevent unity.

When viewed through the culture and collective action lens, there is little debate that SF is in need of a refresher. With dozens of widely publicized gaffs from the laughable through the ethically disassociated, to the downright illegal, SF is losing confidence both publically and intrinsically. From the perspective of a profession-at-arms, Green Berets require absolute confidence amongst themselves and perhaps more importantly, with their partners. An Ambassador who does not trust an SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) – the core SF unit structure – simply will not allow them to do what they need to accomplish under his or her jurisdiction.

Identity remains increasingly important for understanding both the strategic role in conducting unconventional warfare (UW) and other insurgency-related military operations, as well as how SF fit into the broader Department of Defense across multiple phases of conflict. That said, years of population-centric counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have muddied the waters between the SF-specific mission, SOF, and conventional military forces. Specifically, the interaction between military and civilian forces increasingly blurs the lines between SF missions and other military operations involving civilian influence. This blurred distinction has arguably remained "insufficient for understanding the unique context of indigenous leadership” and unconventional warfare (Long, 2017).

In addition, recent conflicts continue to underscore the distinct complexity of an interstate conflict that impacts more than American military forces. These conflicts challenge the understanding of the future of armed conflict and the security dilemma for people in both powerful and developing states. Classic models for sustaining global military and economic equilibrium are being challenged by emerging dynamics and self-organizing structures (Boulton, Allen, & Bowman, 2015; Griffin & Stacey, 2005; Stacey, 2012). Thus, leadership in such complex environments must be reexamined to understand the challenges to the Westphalian world order and the role of military forces in driving strong-state behavior. Previously understood linear models are fast becoming insufficient for understanding concepts of equilibrium and balances of power in favor of complexity and “rapid organizational transformation” (Chiles et al., 2004, p. 501).

With complexity in mind, the uniqueness of the SF mission must remain the centerpiece of the SF identity as distinct from other military organizations. A unified identity will help clarify future combat roles so that the most impactful units will be chosen for the most appropriate missions, and so that the SF role within larger DoD responsibilities remains clear. Other organizations do not have to deal with challenges to identity: the maneuver branches role in the US Army “has remained constant since the earliest days of American military history: to close with and destroy the enemy” (“U.S. Army Infantry School Official Website,” n.d.). However, SF’s unique history can blur the lines and create destabilizing competition between conventional missions and other SOF units.

Understanding the SF Identity

As a branch, SF units have similarities to other units within the broader US military, yet its distinctiveness must also remain clear. SF Soldiers mostly come from the US Army infantry where they derive much of their history, culture, and training. The close association with SF and the Army Ranger School affirms this shared identity based on core skills of patrolling and small-unit tactics. Likewise, SF units share a “joint side” focus on very high-profile direct action missions, as well as information and population-oriented branches such as Psychological Operations (PO) and Civil Affairs (CA). Yet, what do Special Forces do that make them truly special?

To begin with, there must be consensus on what does not make SF unique compared to other units. One of the first claims is that SF is the force that works with foreign personnel or partner forces. However, conventional units also historically work with partner forces and have the primary role in the DoD’s Security Force Assistance mission. Although this claim is often supported by SF language requirements and cultural awareness training, the Soldiers assigned to CA, PO, and the SFA brigades are also trained in language and culture, and many of the members of the joint special operations community also receive similar training. Likewise, SF cannot claim to be the only force that conducts unconventional warfare, as CA and PO again have missions steeped in UW, as do several joint SOF and Special Mission Units (SMU). That said, SF is not unique for working with foreign forces, for learning languages, or for conducting UW, but for their unique mission of conducting special operations across the range of military operations to “disrupt or eliminate threats unilaterally, with partners or friendly indigenous forces” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2012, p. 7).

What makes the SF branch unique is less of a specific role than a unique capability. Although SF units are not the only DoD force that works with foreign countries, SF units are the only force that works with “indigenous forces.” Often called guerrillas, indigenous forces are defined as “irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory” (Joint Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2014). This is the essence of the Green Beret distinction: SF is the only force that is specially selected and trained to lead indigenous forces in “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force…to influence the indigenous population to support the resistance movement or insurgency” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2012, p. 9).

This understanding of Special Forces is not unknown to the members of the Regiment and serves as the critical distinction between Green Beret formations and conventional and other SOF units. In capitalizing on the uniqueness of SF, we propose reframing the unique SF identity as a triple threat of maneuver, Direct Action, and information operation capability through the application of indigenous leadership. Like the infantry, SF units conduct maneuver operations either independently as part of an unconventional warfare campaign, or as part of larger combined arms coalition operations such as Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002. However, as the first tier of the triple threat, SF is the only unit that conducts maneuver operations in combat while in the direct leadership of indigenous forces.

On the second tier of the triple threat, Joint SOF, SMUs, and SF units each conduct Direct Action and other raid-like operations. However, SF operations are unique to other SOF units because they are conducted with indigenous forces on their right and left rather than other highly trained SOF forces. This provides the same operational challenge as more dedicated raiding units, but also adds the significant leadership challenge of operating with and through indigenous forces. Lastly, SF conduct information operations and interact with foreign populations in similar ways as CA and PO units do, but SF detachments do so in the context of UW and indigenous leadership at the point of greatest impact on the battlefield. This military and leadership challenge represents the ultimate in complexity and remains the sole domain of the SF Regiment.

In summary, the comparison of the SF triple threat serves to solidify the distinct and complex nature of SF operations against the backdrop of other related but differently sourced and utilized units. This observation is particularly salient now as the recent decision of the Army to develop regionally oriented SFABs has many members of the community concerned that the SF mission is in decline. The reality is that such fears are the farthest from the truth since the ability to work with indigenous, rather than partner-nation and foreign military forces, remains the core task of Special Forces, and Special Forces are the only units capable of completing it. In this context the difference between indigenous and partner-nation forces is the inherent unorganized nature of the force upon initiation of operations. Indigenous forces are raised whole-cloth from the general populace while partner-nation forces assume that the forces are already organized for action upon US intervention. As a result, the three lightning bolts on the SF patch more accurately represent the guerrilla leadership of maneuver, Direct Action, and Information Operations as much as land, sea or air. Unfortunately, poor identity and media branding continues to dilute and limit the distinct Green Beret identity.

Reframing the Special Forces

Empirical data shows that SF remains the most well-known branch of the Army SOF enterprise compared to CA, PO, Special Operations Aviation, and the 75th Ranger Regiment. However, the use and misuse of the term “Special” in media makes discerning the value of SF against other units increasingly difficult. Studies of media framing show a high likelihood that the terms SF and SOF get congealed at significant rates such that the use of the term “Special Forces” is essentially indistinguishable from “Special Operations Forces.” That said, SF loses out on the specific framing that drives recruiting, funding, and even operational assignments. Senior DoD decision makers are less likely than the average citizen to be confused about what Special Forces is capable of, but in a business where risk mitigation is part of the charter, Special Forces should work towards clarity and developing a deeper understating of what they are best suited for, not just capable of.

In contrast, other formations under the USSOCOM umbrella are branded in more specific terminology. SEALs and Rangers have a particular brand that is less confused with other SOF units, as does Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. That said, the SF branch's use of the term “Green Beret” remains a similarly identifying brand associated with this distinct history and storied reputation. In fact, when reports are specifically oriented to SF units, the term “Green Beret” is used to avoid confusion with other forces. However, the opposite has happened, and the SF regiment should promote rather than degrade the unique distinction of the title “Green Beret" to describe themselves and their unique capabilities.

Conclusion

The formation of an organization’s identity is a critical function of leadership and must be approached as a deliberate activity with a known end state. As a Regiment, Special Forces have an interest in acknowledging their uniqueness among fellow maneuver, Direct Action, and Influence Operations units. Unfortunately, nearly twenty years of indigenous leadership has been diluted by the similarities between the SF and SOF terms, and competition for budgets and missions has incentivized all branches to compete for relevance.

For these reasons, the time has come for the Special Forces Regiment to relook its identity and reframe Green Beret skills to be as valuable and special as they truly are. The ability to function as a strategic triple threat in indigenous-based military operations should be embraced with pride, even against more fashionable emerging aims such as Security Force Assistance and regional orientation. Even when SF conduct unilateral operations without indigenous forces, it should remember that their true strategic value stems from the ability to lead guerrillas, and the strategic effects of those indigenous forces will always be greater than SF acting alone.

Likewise, while Special Forces ties to indigenous forces can come at the expense of other combat forces gaining operational experience or accomplishing vital tasks, the SF function helps the entire US military win wars as part of a team. When they are the main effort, SF must demonstrate the capabilities of this triple threat, and likewise remain adaptable to being useful when in support of other units. Uniqueness is not an excuse for a “super soldier” mentality though. When SF train to look, act, and perform differently from other units, they must ensure that they see the big picture and avoid divisiveness with other branches. The ability to lead combined teams of SF Soldiers, guerrilla, auxiliary and underground forces, and indigenous populations of mostly developing countries suggests that SF should remain the most capable team players when working with other DoD units. The unique SF jargon of “G chief” and “getting in the G base” applies in almost everything they do. SF must embrace the ability to treat every situation with the care and cultural savvy of a UW operation.

Lastly, the strategic nature of the SF branch is seen as they are often called to serve at the political level of conflict, and often where indigenous forces matter greatly. However, if SF fail to solidify the core identity of unique leadership of those forces, then US political decision makers will remain hesitant to send them into the fight. This is especially salient given the networked and unconventional nature of adversarial efforts to build their own friendly government-like structures amidst competing political and social groups. They are using “special forces” to undermine US interests, and it is high time the US pushes back with its own Special Forces, a job specifically designed for Green Berets and their triple threat capabilities.