Background. Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi (kown by it's former name - Boko Haram) is an extremist Islamic terrorist organization, affilated with, or has sworn allegiance to ISIS and is operating in Northeast Nigeria, using the dense Sambisa forest as an operational base as well as the adjacent borders of Cameroon, Chad and Niger to continue their extremist Islamist campaign against Christians. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls (the Chibook girls) for sex slaves and wives) and again in February 2018, another 110 girls were thought to have been taken captive by Boko Haram. Founded in 2002 and led since 2009 by Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands and displaced over 2 million from their homes, ranking as one of the the world's first or second deadliest terror groups.
A dozen U.S. troops just wrapped up a seven-week trip to Nigeria, where they trained local soldiers in advanced infantry tactics that, in all likelihood, they’ll use to beat back religious extremist terror in their country. The soldiers, some Green Berets performing a trtaining missions under Fort Bragg’s Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) with some assistance from some infantrymen from 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, visited the Nigerian Army Infantry School to train 200 soldiers from the 26th Infantry Battalion.
“They face a significant threat from both Boko Haram and ISIS,” Capt. Stephen Gouthro, the group’s officer-in-charge, told Army Times in a Feb. 15 phone interview. “We, as Americans, have been working with this country in various capacities, and this is just one more of those capacities where they would like our assistance with tactics … the way we do business.” SATMO, is mostly known for providing support to foreign military sales. Recently, SATMO soldiers have gone to countries like Slovakia and Colombia to train their troops on that new equipment.
The group in Nigeria focused on advanced infantry skills, starting with patrolling and counter-IED training, working up to movement-to-contact and ambushes or raids with a platoon-sized element. Every day, according to the group’s noncommissioned officer-in-charge, the U.S. soldiers would take the Nigerian soldiers through a variety of training lanes. “One lane could be doing IEDs and raids that day,” said Sgt. 1st Class Chris Campbell. “Another lane would be doing enemy prisoner-of-war searches or ambushes.” Those rotations would go on all day, with a midday break. “We take them out, we assess their capes, and then we try to improve what they already have,” Campbell said.
According to Gouthro, what they already had was more than his soldiers expected going into it. “They’re structured very similarly to what we’re used to, which helps us. They have similar roles,” he said. “They understand that the platoon leader is in charge of the overall plan, understand the platoon sergeant is there to take care of – as we say – the ‘beans and the bullets.’ Sustainment-type operations.”
They had the basics, Campbell said. “I think, really, what they need help with is, a little bit of planning and a little bit of employing leadership tactics on their platoon,” he said. “Because they move well, they just need a little tweaking in controlling, planning and executing their missions at the leadership level.” So the group shared their skills, while being careful not to dictate how they manage discipline and organization. “We do give guidance on that, but at the same time, it’s their army — so we’re not changing the way they do business,” he said. “We’re just building on what they already have.”
The SATMO mission members had some experience with training Iraqi and Afghan forces, he added, but they didn’t want to pre-judge the Nigerian army. “We were very impressed at the level of motivation and desire to learn that the Nigerian soldiers brought to the training,” Gouthro said. And, he added, in all likelihood the 26th Infantry Battalion will soon be using those honed skills in theater. “They’re not specifically slated for a deployment, that we’re aware of, but we know that the rotation will come around for them to rotate up north, to the Lake Chad Basin, where most of the conflict is in the country,” Gouthro said.
While soldiers from both Special Forces and civil affairs backgrounds have been deploying to the area for years to help local forces stabilize, the U.S. presence in the region came to a head late last year when an ambush killed four Americans deployed to Niger.
Showing posts with label Islamic terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic terrorism. Show all posts
Monday, February 26, 2018
Saturday, February 4, 2017
U.S. Special Forces Host Islamist Who Urged Support for Radical Faction
The U.S. Special Forces Command hosted Mouaz Moustafa, an American Islamist who urged U.S. policymakers to embrace the Islamic Front in 2013, at their Tampa headquarters on Thursday, a post on his Facebook page shows. The Islamic Front's charter called for replacing the Assad regime with an Islamic theocracy ruled by shariah law.
Moustafa heads the Syrian Emergency Taskforce (SETF), an organization that lobbies on behalf of anti-Assad rebels. SETF organized U.S. Sen. John McCain's May 2013 Syria trip. SETF also enjoyed close ties with the Obama State Department.
"The focus now is to depose the regime and kick out people like Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and others that are killing us. And so that's the best way to describe their ideology," Moustafa said in 2013. "I think the international community and the West ... must engage with the Islamic Front and need to be more pragmatic and realistic about what is going on ground in Syria in order to bring them on board with whatever political solution will happen in the future."
SETF tried to push the State Department to deal directly with the Islamic Front, records show. Robert Ford, then the U.S. ambassador to Syrian, met with Islamic Front representatives later in 2013.
The Islamic Front was a coalition of rebel groups including Ahrar al-Sham (aka "the Syrian Taliban"), Suquor al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam, Ansar al-Shariah, Tawhid Brigade, and Liwa Al-Haqq. Suquor al-Sham and Liwa al-Haqq have since merged with Ahrar al-Sham.
Ahrar al-Sham remains one of the most important factions in Syria's ongoing civil war. Its founder, Abu Khalid Al-Suri, acted as al-Qaida leader Ayman Zawahiri's right-hand man there. Late Ahrar al-Sham leader Hasan Aboud condemned democracy, calling it a "sword hanging on everyone that Western powers want." He preferred establishing a caliphate under shariah law.
Last July, Amnesty International accused Ahrar al-Sham of torture and other human rights violations. Ahrar al-Sham also has been known to engage in beheadings. Similarly, Jaish al-Islam's late leader Zahran Alloush endorsed restoring the caliphate and expressed support for Osama bin Laden.
Jaish al-Islam also engaged in atrocities, including beheading captive ISIS fighters while forcing them to dress in uniforms similar to "Jihadi John." In one instance, Jaish al-Islam executed and subsequently crucified a man it accused of cursing God, practicing witchcraft, taking drugs, committing adultery and kidnapping. Images of the executed man's crucified, decapitated body were circulated online.
Groups comprising the Islamic Front also fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra prior to Moustafa's request for the Obama administration to work with the jihadist coalition.
The above article is from Steven Emerson's The Investigative Project on Terrorism
Moustafa heads the Syrian Emergency Taskforce (SETF), an organization that lobbies on behalf of anti-Assad rebels. SETF organized U.S. Sen. John McCain's May 2013 Syria trip. SETF also enjoyed close ties with the Obama State Department.
"The focus now is to depose the regime and kick out people like Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and others that are killing us. And so that's the best way to describe their ideology," Moustafa said in 2013. "I think the international community and the West ... must engage with the Islamic Front and need to be more pragmatic and realistic about what is going on ground in Syria in order to bring them on board with whatever political solution will happen in the future."
SETF tried to push the State Department to deal directly with the Islamic Front, records show. Robert Ford, then the U.S. ambassador to Syrian, met with Islamic Front representatives later in 2013.
The Islamic Front was a coalition of rebel groups including Ahrar al-Sham (aka "the Syrian Taliban"), Suquor al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam, Ansar al-Shariah, Tawhid Brigade, and Liwa Al-Haqq. Suquor al-Sham and Liwa al-Haqq have since merged with Ahrar al-Sham.
Ahrar al-Sham remains one of the most important factions in Syria's ongoing civil war. Its founder, Abu Khalid Al-Suri, acted as al-Qaida leader Ayman Zawahiri's right-hand man there. Late Ahrar al-Sham leader Hasan Aboud condemned democracy, calling it a "sword hanging on everyone that Western powers want." He preferred establishing a caliphate under shariah law.
Last July, Amnesty International accused Ahrar al-Sham of torture and other human rights violations. Ahrar al-Sham also has been known to engage in beheadings. Similarly, Jaish al-Islam's late leader Zahran Alloush endorsed restoring the caliphate and expressed support for Osama bin Laden.
Jaish al-Islam also engaged in atrocities, including beheading captive ISIS fighters while forcing them to dress in uniforms similar to "Jihadi John." In one instance, Jaish al-Islam executed and subsequently crucified a man it accused of cursing God, practicing witchcraft, taking drugs, committing adultery and kidnapping. Images of the executed man's crucified, decapitated body were circulated online.
Groups comprising the Islamic Front also fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra prior to Moustafa's request for the Obama administration to work with the jihadist coalition.
The above article is from Steven Emerson's The Investigative Project on Terrorism
Monday, August 29, 2016
Former Brigadier General: Obama's Briefer Told CENTCOM Official to Skew Intel on ISIS
A former brigadier general revealed on Fox News Monday some new information about the White House's role in U.S. Central Command's skewing of intelligence to downplay the threats of ISIS and Al Qaeda.
Last week, a House Republican task force concluded in a 15-page report that U.S. military leaders altered intelligence reports "to paint a rosier picture" of the U.S.-led fight against ISIS than intelligence analysts believed was warranted.
The report blamed “structural and management changes” at the intelligence directorate for the distortions, but stopped short of explaining WHY the changes were made. According to Defense News, "the problems followed the change in Central Command’s leadership from Marine Gen. James Mattis, as CENTCOM commander, to Army Gen. Lloyd Austin."
U.S. Army Brigadier Gen. Anthony Tata (Ret.) filled in some blanks on Fox News Monday afternoon, and if his allegations are true, the scandal reaches all the way to the president's inner circle.
Tata explained that since Obama withdrew troops from Iraq, "there's been chaos all over the Middle East." But because the president campaigned on getting out of Iraq, he didn't want to hear anything that countered his narrative that it was the right thing to do.
When the official narrative contradicted the facts on the ground, members of the intelligence community cried foul and there was a meeting to deal with the issue.
Via Fox News Insider:
Tata revealed that a source verified to him that he was directed by an individual from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who conducts the president’s daily briefing, to stop producing "products of record" that did not fit the administration's narrative of a defeated Al Qaeda and a non-threatening enemy in ISIS.
Tata said that the president’s briefer told this individual to call him on secure line if he had any intelligence that portrayed ISIS in a stronger light than what the president had characterized to the public, which would not leave a paper trail.
He said that this distortion of intelligence on ISIS essentially led to the U.S. ignoring the growing threat and giving the terror group two years to take root.
Tata said that it was "highly irresponsible" for a senior official to downplay the intelligence because "now we have a real, valid national security threat that was borne out of this directive to Central Command." He added that "now there are actually people being reprised against."
"You have good American soldiers, sailors, Marines and civilians that are being isolated and targeted by people that are in the J-2 [CENTCOM’s intelligence directorate]," Tata said.
Report from PJ Media, 15 August 2016
Last week, a House Republican task force concluded in a 15-page report that U.S. military leaders altered intelligence reports "to paint a rosier picture" of the U.S.-led fight against ISIS than intelligence analysts believed was warranted.
The report blamed “structural and management changes” at the intelligence directorate for the distortions, but stopped short of explaining WHY the changes were made. According to Defense News, "the problems followed the change in Central Command’s leadership from Marine Gen. James Mattis, as CENTCOM commander, to Army Gen. Lloyd Austin."
U.S. Army Brigadier Gen. Anthony Tata (Ret.) filled in some blanks on Fox News Monday afternoon, and if his allegations are true, the scandal reaches all the way to the president's inner circle.
Tata explained that since Obama withdrew troops from Iraq, "there's been chaos all over the Middle East." But because the president campaigned on getting out of Iraq, he didn't want to hear anything that countered his narrative that it was the right thing to do.
When the official narrative contradicted the facts on the ground, members of the intelligence community cried foul and there was a meeting to deal with the issue.
Via Fox News Insider:
Tata revealed that a source verified to him that he was directed by an individual from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who conducts the president’s daily briefing, to stop producing "products of record" that did not fit the administration's narrative of a defeated Al Qaeda and a non-threatening enemy in ISIS.
Tata said that the president’s briefer told this individual to call him on secure line if he had any intelligence that portrayed ISIS in a stronger light than what the president had characterized to the public, which would not leave a paper trail.
He said that this distortion of intelligence on ISIS essentially led to the U.S. ignoring the growing threat and giving the terror group two years to take root.
Tata said that it was "highly irresponsible" for a senior official to downplay the intelligence because "now we have a real, valid national security threat that was borne out of this directive to Central Command." He added that "now there are actually people being reprised against."
"You have good American soldiers, sailors, Marines and civilians that are being isolated and targeted by people that are in the J-2 [CENTCOM’s intelligence directorate]," Tata said.
Report from PJ Media, 15 August 2016
Labels:
CENTCOM,
Down Played Intel,
Faulty Intel,
ISIS,
Islamic terrorism
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
AFRICOM’s Flintlock develops tactics to take on Boko Haram threat
U.S. special operations forces on Monday concluded three weeks of training with regional partners in western Africa who are confronting the growing threat posed by the Islamic militant group Boko Haram, which may be seeking closer cooperation with the Islamic State.
The Flintlock exercise, the largest conducted by Special Operations Command Africa, brought together troops from several countries to work on a range of tactics to be deployed in fighting Boko Haram, which is based in Nigeria but threatens the stability of neighboring states.
“We find this year’s exercise both unique and very relevant,” Africa Command’s Gen. David Rodriguez said during Monday’s closing ceremony in Chad. “Because, as you know, here today in Ndjamena, we are not far removed from the immediate threat of Boko Haram.”
Eliminating the threat of violent extremists will require a multinational effort “involving political will, economic development and professional security forces,” Rodriguez said in remarks provided by his staff.
The exercise, which was hosted by Chad with outstation training sites in several other countries, comes as Boko Haram’s profile is on the rise.
On Saturday, the group’s leader — Abubakar Shekau — declared in an unconfirmed message allegiance to the Islamic State, raising concerns that the two terrorist groups might unite into a more formal alliance. Already, there have been some questions about Boko Haram’s picking up on some Islamic State propaganda tactics, such as carrying out choreographed beheadings on video.
During the past year, Boko Haram’s assaults have steadily intensified, both within northern Nigeria and now stretching into border areas with neighboring states such as Chad and Niger, which also participated in this year’s Flintlock.
A focal point of the exercise was boosting the communication capabilities of regional forces, Rodriguez said.
“For example, we have implemented a collaborative command-and-control and information-sharing system that will remain in place for our African partners to share operational information and intelligence with each other, the U.S. and other international partners,” Rodriguez said. “This capability was not just effective during the exercise. It has been extremely useful in real-world application.”
Boko Haram, which translates as “Western education is sinful,” aims to overthrow Nigeria’s secular government and install a strict form of Sharia law.
SFA Chapter IX Comment: Boko Haram has recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Boko Haram operates in and controls much of Northeast Nigeria adjacent to the borders of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. While the Armies/Security Forces of Niger and Cameroon are challenged when fighting Boko Haram unilaterally, every time Chad Army units engage Boko Haram they come away with signifcant success.
For AFRICOM, exercises such as Flintlock are a way to increase the capabilities of indigenous forces, which are at the front lines in the fight against Boko Haram. Chad, Niger and Cameroon are among the countries that have pledged to increase their operations against the group.
While Boko Haram has put pressure on neighboring states, Nigeria has borne the brunt of the group’s attacks. About 1 million Nigerians have been displaced, and the government has struggled to find a way to contain the group, which has swept through swathes of the country’s north.
“We will continue to build upon the training we’ve accomplished and the lessons we’ve learned,” Rodriguez said. “We’ll remain focused on increasing regional military and civil cooperation and information flow, and cross-border coordination to combat violent extremist organizations.”
Article written by John Vandiver for Stars and Stripes
The Flintlock exercise, the largest conducted by Special Operations Command Africa, brought together troops from several countries to work on a range of tactics to be deployed in fighting Boko Haram, which is based in Nigeria but threatens the stability of neighboring states.
“We find this year’s exercise both unique and very relevant,” Africa Command’s Gen. David Rodriguez said during Monday’s closing ceremony in Chad. “Because, as you know, here today in Ndjamena, we are not far removed from the immediate threat of Boko Haram.”
Eliminating the threat of violent extremists will require a multinational effort “involving political will, economic development and professional security forces,” Rodriguez said in remarks provided by his staff.
The exercise, which was hosted by Chad with outstation training sites in several other countries, comes as Boko Haram’s profile is on the rise.
On Saturday, the group’s leader — Abubakar Shekau — declared in an unconfirmed message allegiance to the Islamic State, raising concerns that the two terrorist groups might unite into a more formal alliance. Already, there have been some questions about Boko Haram’s picking up on some Islamic State propaganda tactics, such as carrying out choreographed beheadings on video.
During the past year, Boko Haram’s assaults have steadily intensified, both within northern Nigeria and now stretching into border areas with neighboring states such as Chad and Niger, which also participated in this year’s Flintlock.
A focal point of the exercise was boosting the communication capabilities of regional forces, Rodriguez said.
“For example, we have implemented a collaborative command-and-control and information-sharing system that will remain in place for our African partners to share operational information and intelligence with each other, the U.S. and other international partners,” Rodriguez said. “This capability was not just effective during the exercise. It has been extremely useful in real-world application.”
Boko Haram, which translates as “Western education is sinful,” aims to overthrow Nigeria’s secular government and install a strict form of Sharia law.
SFA Chapter IX Comment: Boko Haram has recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Boko Haram operates in and controls much of Northeast Nigeria adjacent to the borders of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. While the Armies/Security Forces of Niger and Cameroon are challenged when fighting Boko Haram unilaterally, every time Chad Army units engage Boko Haram they come away with signifcant success.
For AFRICOM, exercises such as Flintlock are a way to increase the capabilities of indigenous forces, which are at the front lines in the fight against Boko Haram. Chad, Niger and Cameroon are among the countries that have pledged to increase their operations against the group.
While Boko Haram has put pressure on neighboring states, Nigeria has borne the brunt of the group’s attacks. About 1 million Nigerians have been displaced, and the government has struggled to find a way to contain the group, which has swept through swathes of the country’s north.
“We will continue to build upon the training we’ve accomplished and the lessons we’ve learned,” Rodriguez said. “We’ll remain focused on increasing regional military and civil cooperation and information flow, and cross-border coordination to combat violent extremist organizations.”
Article written by John Vandiver for Stars and Stripes
Friday, August 22, 2014
Why US Special Forces failed to rescue James Foley
US intelligence officials still know relatively little about the workings of Islamic State militants. James Foley may have been traded by insurgent groups before ending up in IS hands, which complicates the intelligence picture stated Anna Mulrine, a Staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor in an August 21st article.
The failed attempt to rescue journalist James Foley before he was killed by Islamic State militants – and the ongoing efforts to track down other American hostages before it’s too late – illustrate a glaring shortcoming in US military capabilities: that good US military intelligence on these militant groups is in short supply.
Although the Pentagon greenlighted the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Syria – along with the US military’s most high-tech air and ground components – the mission did not result in a rescue.
“Unfortunately, the mission was not successful, because the hostages were not present at the targeted location,” Rear Adm. John Kirby, Pentagon press secretary, said in a statement Wednesday evening.
Even so, defense officials sought to put a positive spin on the mission. “This operation, by the way, was a flawless operation,” Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a briefing with reporters Thursday afternoon. “But the hostages were not there.”
The Pentagon’s unusual confirmation of a failed Special Forces mission – made at the behest of the White House – was in large part an effort to reassure the American public that the United States has not sat idly by during the meteoric rise of the Islamic State (IS).
But the news drove home the point, too, that US intelligence officials still know relatively little about the workings of IS.
Pentagon officials bristled at this implication, however. “Was this a failure of intelligence? No,” Secretary Hagel insisted. “The fact is that intelligence does not come wrapped in a package with a bow. It is a mosaic of many pictures, many factors.”
The problem, he added in a favorite Pentagon maxim, is that “the enemy always has a say in everything.”
True, hostage rescue operations using Special Forces are “extraordinarily complicated” under any circumstances, says Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, a nonresident fellow in the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
That’s in large part because “high-value hostages are high-value assets to our adversaries, and they’re going to do what they can to preserve that asset, so they are going to be kept in highly protected, inaccessible places,” he says.
This is further complicated by the fact that as Al Qaeda leadership has been fragmented through US military strikes, the jihadist movement has become more diffuse as well, with “increasing numbers of groups and jihadist fighters,” says Paul Scharre, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security who previously served as a specialist on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs at the Pentagon.
Mr. Foley, for example, may have been traded and bartered by different insurgent groups before ending up in IS hands, which in turn complicates the intelligence picture.
“Hostages may be traded for weapons, for territory. Government forces could give a hostage to a rebel group in exchange for leaving them alone in certain areas,” says Mr. Nelson, whose last military assignment before retiring from the Navy was with the Joint Special Operations Command.
Even when the intelligence picture is clearer, “one of the things people may not be aware of is that in Iraq and Afghanistan, when SOF would go on raids and go after terrorist networks, a huge number of those raids ended up in the person you’re looking for not being there,” Mr. Scharre says.
But even failed missions can be of intelligence value, analysts note.
“If the hostage had spent time at the site, you might have access to people who had been holding him at one time,” Nelson says. Then it might be possible to pick up information about “everything from when was the last time the hostages ate to their health, to what rank or role do you have in this terrorist organization, to what are your next set of battle plans?” he adds. “You rarely walk away with nothing.”
Even the grisly video of the execution itself is being scrubbed now by intelligence analysts, Nelson notes. “We now dust for electronic prints the way we used to dust for fingerprints. Every piece of intelligence is a piece of intelligence we can use,” he says. “Who was standing next to Foley in the video? Where did it happen? These are electronic clues.”
The failed attempt to rescue journalist James Foley before he was killed by Islamic State militants – and the ongoing efforts to track down other American hostages before it’s too late – illustrate a glaring shortcoming in US military capabilities: that good US military intelligence on these militant groups is in short supply.
Although the Pentagon greenlighted the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Syria – along with the US military’s most high-tech air and ground components – the mission did not result in a rescue.
“Unfortunately, the mission was not successful, because the hostages were not present at the targeted location,” Rear Adm. John Kirby, Pentagon press secretary, said in a statement Wednesday evening.
Even so, defense officials sought to put a positive spin on the mission. “This operation, by the way, was a flawless operation,” Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a briefing with reporters Thursday afternoon. “But the hostages were not there.”
The Pentagon’s unusual confirmation of a failed Special Forces mission – made at the behest of the White House – was in large part an effort to reassure the American public that the United States has not sat idly by during the meteoric rise of the Islamic State (IS).
But the news drove home the point, too, that US intelligence officials still know relatively little about the workings of IS.
Pentagon officials bristled at this implication, however. “Was this a failure of intelligence? No,” Secretary Hagel insisted. “The fact is that intelligence does not come wrapped in a package with a bow. It is a mosaic of many pictures, many factors.”
The problem, he added in a favorite Pentagon maxim, is that “the enemy always has a say in everything.”
True, hostage rescue operations using Special Forces are “extraordinarily complicated” under any circumstances, says Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, a nonresident fellow in the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
That’s in large part because “high-value hostages are high-value assets to our adversaries, and they’re going to do what they can to preserve that asset, so they are going to be kept in highly protected, inaccessible places,” he says.
This is further complicated by the fact that as Al Qaeda leadership has been fragmented through US military strikes, the jihadist movement has become more diffuse as well, with “increasing numbers of groups and jihadist fighters,” says Paul Scharre, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security who previously served as a specialist on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs at the Pentagon.
Mr. Foley, for example, may have been traded and bartered by different insurgent groups before ending up in IS hands, which in turn complicates the intelligence picture.
“Hostages may be traded for weapons, for territory. Government forces could give a hostage to a rebel group in exchange for leaving them alone in certain areas,” says Mr. Nelson, whose last military assignment before retiring from the Navy was with the Joint Special Operations Command.
Even when the intelligence picture is clearer, “one of the things people may not be aware of is that in Iraq and Afghanistan, when SOF would go on raids and go after terrorist networks, a huge number of those raids ended up in the person you’re looking for not being there,” Mr. Scharre says.
But even failed missions can be of intelligence value, analysts note.
“If the hostage had spent time at the site, you might have access to people who had been holding him at one time,” Nelson says. Then it might be possible to pick up information about “everything from when was the last time the hostages ate to their health, to what rank or role do you have in this terrorist organization, to what are your next set of battle plans?” he adds. “You rarely walk away with nothing.”
Even the grisly video of the execution itself is being scrubbed now by intelligence analysts, Nelson notes. “We now dust for electronic prints the way we used to dust for fingerprints. Every piece of intelligence is a piece of intelligence we can use,” he says. “Who was standing next to Foley in the video? Where did it happen? These are electronic clues.”
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