Eight Green Berets quietly disciplined after Afghan prisoner’s beating death

American Green Berets beat an Afghan commando, twisted his testicles and slammed him against a breaker box during an interrogation in western Afghanistan on Oct. 22, 2018, a civilian translator claimed as part of a criminal probe that only closed last year.

The commando, Wahedullah Khan, was detained after he opened fire on Czech special operators, killing one and injuring two others. Wahedullah was captured, handed over to NATO forces and interrogated in a cramped room on Shindand Air Base, according to the redacted case file obtained by Military Times through a Freedom of Information Act request and reported here for the first time. “I want to break his jaw,” the translator recalled one U.S. soldier saying. “No, not yet,” another responded, according to the translator. “I need him to finish answering my questions.”

Hours later, Wahedullah was dead from blunt force trauma. The translator said Americans approached him that same night and told him to keep quiet about the incident. “Forget that this happened,” the translator recalled several soldiers warning him. “You didn’t see anything.”

Soon, the Green Berets came under scrutiny from the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter and murder. They denied harming Wahedullah and blamed the death on other Afghan commandos. Blood found in the interrogation room suggested another course of events. “CID conducted a crime scene examination of the room, where Mr. Wahedullah was assaulted,” CID’s final report stated. “The room appeared to have been cleaned; however, blood spatter was identified on the walls and ceiling. A laboratory analysis of the blood spatter revealed the blood matched the DNA profile of Mr. Wahedullah.”

The case closed in May 2021. All evidence was turned over to 1st Special Forces Command, where leadership decided against prosecution. General officer memorandums of reprimand were instead issued to eight Green Berets from 7th Special Forces Group, including a captain, a chief warrant officer, a master sergeant, three sergeants first class and two staff sergeants. All names were redacted in the case file, but six letters were permanently filed, meaning they will follow those soldiers throughout their careers.“In this case, the investigation’s results did not present sufficient evidence of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the offenses, which is the standard required to obtain a conviction at court-martial,” Maj. Dan Lessard, spokesman for 1st Special Forces Command, said in a statement. “Furthermore, there was not probable cause to believe that the most serious alleged offenses, including murder, had occurred.”

Even with the translator’s testimony, CID did not determine in its final report who delivered Wahedullah’s death blow. Wahedullah was passed between troops from three different countries over 10 hours and his blood was found in a room where both Americans and Czechs took turns questioning him.

‘He just lost his mind’

Wahedullah attacked at about 2 p.m. earlier that day. Czech special operators were escorting a civilian truck onto Shindand Air Base when their rear vehicle suddenly took gunfire from a nearby compound owned by Afghanistan’s 4th Special Operations Kandak, according to the case file. After Wahedullah opened fire, the Czechs raced three casualties to a medical clinic on Camp Conde, which was part of Shindand.

Afghan commandos later called the U.S. base to say they had the shooter in custody. The Afghans arrived with Wahedullah at roughly 5 p.m. He was dressed in a track suit with sandals, according to an American who escorted the Afghans to two Green Beret intelligence sergeants waiting near the interrogation room. The American who escorted the truck later told investigators the building was chosen because it was far away from the medical evacuation area and from unnecessary personnel watching everything unfold.

U.S. forces needed to know whether another attack was coming, according to the investigation. The base heightened its security posture following the shooting. And Jaguar 50, call sign for the Green Beret team’s JTAC, a close air support specialist, spotted an individual crawling towards the camp with a satchel when helicopters came for the Czech casualties.

With the help of the translator, the Green Berets sifted through Wahedullah’s phone and other personal items for shreds of useful information. Meanwhile, the Czechs interrogated Wahedullah. The translator told investigators he heard screams coming from inside the room. The Green Berets and the translator entered next. They wanted to know if “there were more people or threats waiting,” one Green Beret later told investigators.

The Green Berets denied harming Wahedullah during questioning. They said the turn-coat commando failed to answer most questions. Wahedullah told them he had been feeling ill and went “crazy” while on guard shift. “He did not know the names of any of the soldiers he lived with, ate with, or prayed with because he was new to the unit and had only been there for five months,” one Green Beret stated. “Again we asked him who hired him to do this or why he did it and he insisted he just lost his mind. We could not get him to explain if it was in retaliation or if he had ever been in contact with the Taliban.”

Wahedullah at one point recalled Americans mortaring his village years ago, killing three women. “He claimed that Americans make mistakes all the time when they kill innocent civilians and it was the same as his mistake,” another Green Beret stated. “When asked to further elaborate on that comment he just kept referring to that he went crazy.”

‘You never saw anything’

The Americans questioned Wahedullah for about 30 minutes before turning him back over to Czech special operators, according to the investigation. Wahedullah wasn’t harmed while in either group’s custody, the Americans said. In a statement made days after the shooting while still on Camp Conde, the translator largely agreed with the Green Berets’ version of events. But on Nov. 7, 2018, now on Bagram Air Base and away from the remote camp, the translator provided a statement with a far different narrative.

During the interrogation, a zip-tied Wahedullah was repeatedly assaulted by multiple Americans from 7th Special Forces Group, the translator told investigators at Bagram. The Americans choked Wahedullah, hit him in his crotch, slammed his head off objects and beat him, the translator alleged. One of the interrogators brandished a knife, the translator added. “Now you are going to tell me the truth or I am going to slit your throat,” the U.S. soldier warned, according to the translator. But another man, who the translator referred to as “chief,” told him to put the knife away.

At one point, a Czech soldier entered the room. “He had big eyes, and was bald, and started choking the shooter and spitting on him, grabbing his hair, he yelled at the shooter and pounded on the desk,” the translator stated. Questions were asked during the interrogation. But Wahedullah had a “hard time talking” and “struggled to answer,” the translator said.

Eventually, the Americans decided they wouldn’t get any information and ended the interrogation. The translator claimed that the last time he saw Wahedullah outside the room, the man was was bleeding from his nose and mouth, and his face was swollen around his eyes and forehead. The translator said he was then approached by an American and told, “Listen, this never happened, you never saw anything, forget this.”

Later that night, more Americans knocked on his room door. “They told me, if you are ever asked what happened to tell them we only asked a few tactical questions and collected biometric information and then left,” the translator stated. “They asked me to repeat it several times, which I did.”

Wahedullah was turned back over to his unit at roughly 7 p.m. Other Afghan commandos put him in the bed of their Ford Ranger truck. An Afghan commander ask why Wahedullah was in the back, according to the translator, who was present. “He was bleeding so badly, we put him in the back instead of the back seat,” the other Afghan commandos answered.

‘They beat him’

Hours later, an individual from the U.S. Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan called the operations center on Camp Conde to say they received reports that Wahedullah was about to die after he was abused by Czech forces. It wasn’t clear from the redacted investigation how the task force learned of the situation. Regardless, Wahedullah was once again brought back to the Americans, this time in an attempt to save his life. He arrived on a stretcher. A dressing was over his head, an IV was in his arm and a plastic tube was inserted into his nasal airway to help him breathe, according to an American doctor who saw Wahedullah at Camp Conde’s clinic.

Wahedullah had no pulse when he arrived. A surgical team tried to resuscitate him, but to no avail. After he was pronounced dead, one doctor turned to the Afghan sergeant major who brought the beaten body and asked questions. “l asked what happened and [the sergeant major] answered me, ‘They beat him.’ I asked when and he repeated it,” the surgeon said in his witness statement.

While in the clinic, the Afghan sergeant major said openly that every commando at the 4th Special Operations Kandak “had a go” at Wahedullah, implying they were the ones who beat him, several Green Berets stated. When investigators questioned one of the Green Berets further about this exchange, and who heard it, the soldier explained that the surgical team was too far away and distracted to listen in.

The translator, who was also in the clinic, disputed that the Afghan sergeant major made those comments. “No, l never heard that,” the translator stated, adding that those individuals never spoke in the clinic.

Czech officials conducted their own investigation into Wahedullah’s death, according to the case file, but those details were withheld in the copy provided to Military Times because it was considered third-party information. Czech Ministry of Defense spokesman Jakub Fajnor told Military Times that their investigation remains open, but declined to comment further. “The Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic is not allowed to comment on an ongoing investigation,” Fajnor said in an email. “The supervising public prosecutor’s office in Brno has reserved the right to provide information about the case. According to our sources, the public prosecutor’s office is planning to contact the American authorities with a cooperation request.” The Czech prosecutor’s office in Brno did not return a request for further information.

‘I know I can’t do that’

The case file indicates that Czech special operators were highly regarded by Americans. One Green Beret, who the redacted investigation suggests was in a leadership position, said in his statement that Czech troops took great pride in being one of the few allied forces to conduct missions outside the wire.

The Czechs wouldn’t have done anything to jeopardize that, according to the Green Beret leader, who was interviewed as part of the investigation but who was not present during the interrogation or Wahedullah’s handoff.

He also told investigators about an encounter he had hours after the attack. An individual, who contextual clues in the case file suggest was a Czech commander, walked into the American’s office and shut the door.

“He was visibly upset [over Wahedullah’s attack] and frustrated yet composed,” the Green Beret leader said. “He had tears welling up as he told me, ‘I want to kill him, that shooter needs to be dead, but I know I can’t do that.’ It seemed he needed to vent in private where his guys couldn’t see. According to what l saw of his body language and heard in his voice, he truly understood the rules, even if he was frustrated with it.”

The translator’s second statement, which implicated both Green Berets and Czech troops, was made two weeks after the incident. Some disturbing accusations remained the same in both statements, including that the translator heard screaming while Czech troops were questioning Wahedullah without Americans and that Wahedullah was bleeding badly when turned over to the other Afghan commandos. But the translator’s detailed account of Green Berets beating Wahedullah was new.

Defense lawyers could’ve pounced on that change, said retired Army Lt. Col. Franklin Rosenblatt, who served as the lead military defense counsel for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, an American held captive by the Taliban for five years after deserting his post.

However, the translator could’ve also explained in court why he initially withheld details. “There could be reasons why [the translator] did this. If he was under some sort of coercion or threat or intimidation before and once he was free of those things, he was liberated to speak and said what he had to say,” Rosenblatt explained.

When Wahedullah’s death first became public, it was reported that the Green Beret team had been withdrawn early from Afghanistan. Taking troops out of a war zone where alleged crimes occurred can make cases more difficult to prosecute because of difficulties obtaining the necessary evidence and witnesses, according to Rosenblatt, who has argued that the court-martial system should be able to follow U.S. forces on deployment. “These are crucial Afghan witnesses,” Rosenblatt said. “Good luck being able to identify them and work out the visa issues to get them here. The Czech soldiers, they’re also essential witnesses for this. The prospects for prosecution, even if the prosecution did have merit, really changed once everyone flew back to the States.”

The general officer memorandums of reprimand, or GOMORs, may have been the most aggressive action available given the evidence. “Credit goes to [1st Special Forces Command] for seemingly doing all that could be done in this situation,” Rosenblatt added. “The result of permanently filed GOMORs is significant and will likely have career consequences for each of those implicated.”

Article from the Army Times

General Wingate's Chindits - The WWII Burma Theatre Guerilla Force

Upon the beginning of Japan’s China-Burma campaign, just prior to the US entry into World War II, the British Government sent Maj. Gen. Orde Wingate to India to employ his experience as a guerrilla fighter and organize what became known as the Chindits—a brigade of specially trained Gurkha (Nepalese), Burmese and British troops.

Wingate was no stranger to Guerilla Warfare or working with indigenous troops.  He was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, and a well known eccentric who both quoted the Bible and advocated irregular warfare tactics. His career as a guerrilla fighter began as he organized Jewish underground patrols to beat back Arab raids in British-controlled Palestine in the 1930s. In 1941, Wingate led a mixed Ethiopian and Sudanese force in retaking Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, from the Italians, who had invaded in 1935.

The Chindits were composed of two units of Long Range Penetration Groups, each made up of men-and mules. Wingate and his brigade entered Japanese-controlled Burma from the west, crossed the Chindwin River, and proceeded with sabotage activity: sneakily penetrating Japanese-held territory, attacking supply lines, and cutting communications. Once in the field, the Chindits were cut off from other units and could be supplied only by airdrops.

One of the most effective Chindit attacks was against the Mandalay-Myitkina railway, when they blew up three bridges while also beating back Japanese troops determined to stop the demolitions. The Chindits continued to wreak havoc–at one point killing 100 Japanese soldiers while suffering only one loss themselves–until a lack of supplies and troublesome terrain forced them back to India.

On the night of 24 March 1944, General Wingate boarded a transport plane at the Broadway Base in Burma, destined for India. The pilot had complained earlier about the performance of one of the plane’s twin engines, but after Wingate talked with the aircrew, a decision was made to take off. The plane crashed in what is now Manipur in northeast India. The crash was so violent that virtually none of Wingate’s remains were found.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill eulogized Wingate before the House of Commons that August: “There was a man of genius who might well have become also a man of destiny. He has gone, but his spirit lives on in the long range penetration groups, and has underlain all these intricate and daring air operations and military operations based on air transport and on air supply.”

1836 - Mexican army executes 417 Texicans at Goliad

On this day, 27 March in 1836, Mexican army executes 417 Texas revolutionaries at Goliad in a disastrous setback for the Texans resisting Santa Anna’s regime, the Mexican army defeats and executes 417 Texas revolutionaries at Goliad.

Long accustomed to enjoying considerable autonomy from their Mexican rulers, many Anglo Texan settlers reacted with alarm when Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna proclaimed himself dictator of Mexico in 1835. Santa Anna immediately imposed martial law and attempted to disarm the Texans. Yet, this move merely fed the flames of Texan resistance.

In November 1835, Texan leaders proclaimed their resistance to Santa Anna’s dictatorship, though they stopped short of calling for independence. The next month, the Texans managed to defeat 800 Mexican soldiers stationed in San Antonio. However, the rebel leaders remained deeply divided over what to do next, making them vulnerable to Santa Anna’s ruthless determination to suppress dissension.

While the Texas rebels dallied, Santa Anna moved decisively. In mid-February he led a massive Mexican army across the Rio Grande, and after a 13-day siege of the Alamo, crushed the rebels in San Antonio. Meanwhile, to the south, Santa Ann’s chief lieutenant, General Urrea, moved to destroy another faction of the rebel army attempting to defend the town of Goliad.

Disagreements among the Texans had led to a division of the rebel forces. James W. Fannin was left with only slightly more than 300 Texans to protect Goliad, a position the rebels needed in order to maintain their supply routes to the Gulf Coast. As Urrea’s much larger 1400-man army approached, Fannin acted with indecision, wondering if he should go to the aid of the besieged men at the Alamo.

Belatedly, Fannin attempted to fall back from the approaching Mexican army, but his retreat order came too late. On March 19, Urrea surrounded the small column of rebel soldiers on an open prairie, where they were trapped without food, water, or cover. After repulsing one Mexican assault, Fannin realized there was no chance of escape. Rather than see his force annihilated, Fannin surrendered.

Apparently, some among the Texans who surrendered believed they would be treated as prisoners of war. Santa Anna, however, had clearly stated several months before that he considered the rebels to be traitors who would be given no quarter. In obedience to Santa Anna’s orders, on this day in 1836 Urrea ordered his men to open fire on Fannin and his soldiers, along with about 100 other captured Texans. More than 400 men were executed that day at Goliad.

Ironically, rather than serving to crush the Texas rebellion, the Goliad Massacre helped inspire and unify the Texans. Now determined to break completely from Mexico, the Texas revolutionaries began to yell “Remember Goliad!” along with the more famous battle cry, “Remember the Alamo!” Less than a month later, Texan forces under General Sam Houston dealt a stunning blow to Santa Anna’s army in the Battle of San Jacinto, and Texas won its independence.

Article from the History Channel

Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler hits #1 with “Ballad of the Green Berets”

Thanks to Hollywood, America’s collective memory of the Vietnam War is now inextricably linked with the popular music of that era. More specifically, it is linked with the music of the late-'60s counterculture and antiwar movement. But opposition to the war was far from widespread back in 1966—a fact that was reflected not just in popular opinion polls, but in the pop charts, too. Near the very height of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, on March 5, 1966, American popular-music fans made a #1 hit out of a song called “The Ballad Of The Green Berets” by Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler.

Sadler was exactly what his name and uniform implied he was: a real-life, active-duty member of the United States Army Special Forces—the elite unit popularly known as the Green Berets. In early 1965, Sadler suffered a severe punji stick injury that brought a premature end to his tour of duty as a combat medic in Vietnam. During his long hospitalization back in the United States, Sadler, an aspiring musician prior to the war, wrote and submitted to music publishers an epic ballad that eventually made its way in printed form to Robin Moore, author of the then-current nonfiction book called The Green Berets. Moore worked with Sadler to whittle his 12-verse original down to a pop-radio-friendly length, and Sadler recorded the song himself in late 1965, first for distribution only within the military, and later for RCA when the original took off as an underground hit. Within two weeks of its major-label release, The Ballad of the Green Berets had sold more than a million copies, going on to become Billboard magazine’s #1 single for all of 1966.

While it would not be accurate to call “The Ballad Of The Green Berets” a pro-war song, it was certainly a song that enjoyed popularity among those who opposed the growing anti-war movement. A year after “Green Berets” came out, Buffalo Springfield would release the anti-war anthem “For What It’s Worth,” which continues to be Hollywood’s go-to choice for many films and television programs depicting American involvement in the Vietnam War. On this day in 1966, however, the American airwaves belonged to a clean cut, uniformed member of the U.S. Army and his anti-antiwar epic.



Article from History Channel

Twenty Four hours after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the defiant last message to a Russian warship from 13 Ukrainian State Border Guards who refused to surrender a Ukrainian island is going viral.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy confirmed the story in a statement Thursday that said the 13 soldiers would be honored for their bravery. The Border Guards were defending the small island of Zmiinyi located in the Black Sea. A Russian warship ordered them to lay down their arms and surrender peacefully.

"This is a Russian military ship. I suggest you lay down your weapons and surrender to avoid bloodshed and unnecessary victims. Otherwise we will open fire on you," the Russians reportedly told them via radio.

"Russian warship, go fuck yourself!" was the reply.

The Russians opened fire on the island and killed all 13 Border Guards. "All the defenders of the island of Zmiinyi died, but did not surrender," the president later confirmed. "All of them will be named Heroes of Ukraine," he said.

A reported recording of the exchange was posted to social media and was widely circulated. The incident was compared by some to that of the 300 Spartans in antiquity who died defending their homeland against invading hoards of Persia. Zmiinyi island translated to English means Snake island, inspiring some to draw parallels to America's own Gadsden flag. "May the memory of those who gave their lives for Ukraine live forever," said Zelenskyy.

Putin is fighting a battle on his home front as well as anti-invasion protests have roared to life on Russian soil. Some reports say as many as 17,000 people have already been arrested in the demonstrations flaring up across Russia.

Notable Quotes following the Invasion 

Ukrainian President Zelensky: “If you in Europe have military training and don’t want to look on the indecisiveness of your politicians, you can move to our country and together with us, defend Europe, where it’s much needed.”

Retired US Navy Admiral (Ret) James Stavridis: "President Zelenskyy has changed out of his suit and into hunting gear. His government is handing out thousands of rifles and showing their people how to make Molotov cocktails. Message for Vladimir Putin? Buckle up."

Retired CIA Clandestine Intelligence Officer John Sipher: "I see reports that Biden's National Security Council is against additional arms to Ukraine or covert activities against the Kremlin for fear of antagonizing Putin. Crazy if true. Putin has been attacking INSIDE our countries for years and now he’s murdering a Democratic people. Toughen up!"

First Medal of Honor action occurred 13 February 1861

Many people think the Medal of honor came about and was first awarded during the Civil War. Actually, thee first MoH was awarded to a Doctor for his actions in a fight between a U.S. Army Infantry and Chiricahua Apaches. Read the below article from History.com

The earliest military action to be awarded a Medal of Honor is performed by Colonel Bernard J.D. Irwin, an assistant army surgeon serving in the first major U.S.-Apache conflict. Near Apache Pass, in southeastern Arizona, Irwin, an Irish-born doctor, volunteered to go to the rescue of Second Lieutenant George N. Bascom, who was trapped with 60 men of the U.S. Seventh Infantry by the Chiricahua Apaches.

Irwin and 14 men, initially without horses, began the 100-mile trek to Bascom’s forces riding on mules. After fighting and capturing Apaches along the way and recovering stolen horses and cattle, they reached Bascom’s forces on February 14 and proved instrumental in breaking the siege. The first U.S.-Apache conflict had begun several days before, when Cochise, the Chiricahua Apache chief, kidnapped three white men to exchange for his brother and two nephews held by the U.S. Army on false charges of stealing cattle and kidnapping a child. When the exchange was refused, Cochise killed the white men, and the army responded by killing his relatives, setting off the first of the Apache wars.

Although Irwin’s bravery in this conflict was the earliest Medal of Honor action, the award itself was not created until 1862, and it was not until January 21, 1894, that Irwin received the nation’s highest military honor.

Chinese Military And Police Commandos

China has taken a unique approach to special operations forces by treating police and military special operations forces as equal. China can do this because it has a national police force, something many developed nations adopted over a century ago. Military commandos first appeared during World War II, after some pre-war tinkering with the idea. Britain found the commando concept useful and developed it more thoroughly than any other nation. After the war Britain concluded that these specialized troops had nothing to do in peace time and disbanded most of them. The exception was the Royal Marines, a force similar to the U.S. Marine Corps but smaller and much older. While the army disbanded all its commando battalions the Royal Marines were allowed to keep a few of them after post-war personnel reductions. These Royal Marine Commandos (battalions) proved to be a good idea because over the next decade Britain revived the wartime SAS airborne and SBS naval commando units while the U.S. revived a much larger organization, the Special Forces. The navy brought back its beach recon force to become the SEALs (Sea. Air, Land) forces that were even more selective and used more rigorous training. During the war these “beach jumpers” were quietly put ashore on enemy beaches at night by small boats or from submarines to check for enemy obstacles and confirm the ability of the beach to handle an amphibious operation. After the war the concept was further expanded to include parachuting in along with other new assignments.

In the 1960 the special operations concept spread to federal and local law enforcement agencies in the United States, where more heavily armed and numerous criminal groups were beginning to appear and proliferate. The same thing was happening in Europe and the rest of the world. The new policing concept was called SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics). During the Korean War (1950-53) and similar leftist rebellions in southeast Asia, old special operations units were revived. It was the U.S. Army Rangers in Korea while Britain saw work for SAS, SBS, and Royal Marine commandos.

China did not pay much attention to special operations until Vietnamese special operations units (“sappers’’) caused Chinese forces considerable problems during a brief 1979-80 border war with newly unified and defiant Vietnam. China demanded that Vietnam halt its intervention into their neighbor Cambodia where Vietnam troops halted the mass murder carried out by the China-backed Khmer-Rouge, who were killing over a million civilians and real or imagined enemies in Cambodia as part of a Maoist Revolution China approved of. This was sending lots of refugees into Vietnam, along with some armed Khmer-Rouge who massacred Vietnamese civilians too. Protests by the Vietnamese Communist government didn’t stop this so they invaded Cambodia and installed a less psychotic regime which was also anti-Chinese.

The Chinese invaded Vietnam to discipline the Vietnam communists who had spent decades fighting Japanese, French, South Vietnamese and American forces. Vietnam now had a large force of combat experienced troops, including the deadly sappers (special operations raiders). After a few months of getting nowhere and suffering lots of casualties, China declared victory and pulled its surviving troops out of the hills that formed much of the border. They also abandoned the Khmer-Rouge and pondered the lessons they had just learned.

The greater effectiveness of combat- experienced Vietnamese troops was understandable, but what were those remarkable and even more lethal sappers? China didn’t really have a word or historical concept for that. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s Chinese military analysts studied the problem and concluded that China could best employ specialized personnel like this with the national police as SWAT (special weapons and tactics) type units also capable of carrying out military style raids. Within a decade this had evolved into special operations combat units. About twenty special operations battalions were organized, most of them assigned to provinces within the six multi-province military districts. These battalion size special operations units were adequate to supply “military reinforcement” for the national police if a local situation got out of control and the government preferred not to send in regular army units.

China did not get into forming special operations troops until the 1980s and each of the military regions and several major police organizations were allowed to develop their own versions of the basic idea; elite troops performing very difficult tasks. Naturally there was more emphasis on martial arts and physical conditioning, both Chinese traditions admired but not always practiced intensively by the military. Chinese special operations skills involve a lot of work on improving reconnaissance capabilities and the ability to track down and quickly kill or capture small groups of troublemakers, especially separatists or religious fanatics. In the 1990s Chinese special operations commanders began looking into using their elite troops for raiding key enemy targets to paralyze an enemy’s ability to move and react. Since 2000 China has been putting its commandos to work more frequently, including outside of China. After all that China now sees its commandos as scary enough to intimidate unruly populations.

Each military region now has a special operations “brigade” with as many as 2,000 troops, most of them the members of three or more special operations battalions with colorful names like Snow Leopards, Thunderbolts, Dragons or Lions. Each brigade had a few hundred army troops for support of the entire brigade.

In a few cases smaller forces of several hundred operators (as commandos are called) are organized for about half a dozen combat divisions plus a few more for some armies. The non-army special operations units tend to be smaller, with lots of them in the various provincial and special police forces. Same with the navy and two marine brigades and its equivalent of the American SEALs. The current plan is to form small (platoon or company size, that is 20-150 troops) special operations units in every division and navy squadron (unit of several warships). The army actually has eleven special operations brigades or (smaller) regiments but the troops are scattered all over the country in the military regions.

By 2015, China began giving its commando forces a lot of publicity. That was also the first year China released details of their commando units, which were organized much like the original British special operations of World War II. The British called each battalion a “commando” and each commando consisted of several smaller (about a hundred personnel) squadrons. The initial publicity in 2015 made much of the fact that one of the two National Police special operations units (the Snow Leopards) won the annual International Warrior Competition (the “Commando Olympics”) two years in a row (2013-14). This involved competing with troops or SWAT operatives from seventeen other nations, including the United States. That said, each year the Americans were not able to send their best because most U.S. special operations troops are either in combat, getting ready for operations or recovering from their last tour. Still, the Snow Leopards did well and in other international operations, usually of a counter-terrorism nature, the Chinese operators consistently demonstrated a professional attitude and mastery of the skills needed to be an effective commando.

In early 2017 China broadcast an interesting TV show that featured one of their commando units carrying out an operation remarkably similar to the 2011 American raid on the compound of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. For the TV show China built what appeared to be a replica of the bin Laden compound and showed Chinese commandos going through many of the same moves the U.S. Navy SEALs were known to have made during the raid, plus a few additional stunts apparently added for dramatic effect. The Chinese dramatization was not described as a reenactment of the bin Laden raid but rather a hypothetical operation in Xinjiang province where about half the population is Moslem, most of them Uighurs (ethnic Turks) and generally hostile to the Chinese presence. Xinjiang is where most Chinese Islamic terrorists come from although most Uighur violence in Xinjiang is against Han (ethnic Chinese) rule, which began in the 18th century and was completed, after much bloodshed, in 1884 when the area was designated Xinjiang province. Han Chinese did not become the majority in Xinjiang until after 2000 and many Uighurs accuse China of trying to erase Uighur culture in order to ensure long-term control over this frontier province. The TV show was sending a message to those Uighurs, reminding them that China had to conquer Xinjiang several times in the 18th and 19th century and that Chinese military capabilities were now capable of handling anything. The TV show did not have to remind the Uighurs that Chinese commandos are now considered world class and one unit, the Show Leopards, has an international reputation, acknowledged by Western nations long known for their excellent commando units.

The Snow Leopards are one of several commando units in the national police and are based in Beijing. Two of the four squadrons of Snow Leopards specialize in commando operations, like hostage rescue or difficult raids. Another squadron handles bomb disposal and exotic (nuclear, biological, complex bombs) weapons while other squadron specializes in snipers. The Snow Leopards were formed in 2002 and trained for five years before going to work. There are several similar units in other parts of China. In general, these police commando units tend to be very secretive. Much is known about the Snow Leopards because they were the first and being in the capital are something of a showcase unit for Chinese special operations in general.

The Snow Leopards are, like many commando units, small (under 500 personnel) and very selective. The Snow Leopards are mainly a counter terrorism unit, of which there are several in the national emergency police, called the PAP or People's Armed Police. The PAP has about 1.5 million personnel. In China, the line between the armed forces and the police is sometimes blurred, especially when it comes to paramilitary outfits like the PAP, which belongs to the Interior Ministry to provide “riot police” or suppress areas experiencing widespread violence, like Tibet or Xinjiang province. The PAP also performs some coast guard duties and keeps an eye on potential unrest in the military. In this respect PAP is similar to the Russian KGB forces that carried out similar tasks. Local policing is carried out by 1.8 million police who work for provincial governors and can always call on the PAP if a situation gets out of hand.

Later in 2015 China announced that it had changed its laws to allow Chinese military and police commandos to operate overseas. This came as a surprise to some in American naval intelligence because it was known that for several years special operations teams had been seen on Chinese warships operating off the Somali coast as part of the international anti-piracy patrol. But as far as anyone knows these commandos never saw any combat although they were observed training a lot. China was expected to use this new authority to offer commandos for sensitive peacekeeping emergencies.

China has a lot of different commando units to send overseas. China allows different services (including the paramilitary PAP) and military regions to create and maintain their own special operations forces. Because of that there are ten separate special operations forces (seven military regions, the navy and the national police have two). The capital (Beijing, also a military region) has the largest force with over 3,000 personnel. Since the late 1990s total manpower has expanded from about 12,000 special operation troops nationwide to over 30,000.

These variations also hide the fact that most of these troops, while elite, are more similar in capabilities to Western rangers, paratroopers or SWAT teams. There are few who are as capable as the American Special Forces or World War II British SAS and SBS. After World War II there were similar but a bit different SAS variations like American SEALs and Special Forces units that focused on traditional commando ops. The Russians came up with Spetsnaz while the Germans and French and many former British colonies created quite impressive versions of SAS.

Article from the Strategy Page

Special Operations legend John Singlaub has died at the age of 100

Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, a decorated veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and legendary special operator, died Jan. 29 at the age of 100.

Singlaub, a native of Independence, California, commissioned as a U.S Army infantry 2nd lieutenant. Following his graduation from the University of California Los Angeles in 1943. according to the Sandboxx military news website, Singlaub was quickly recruited by the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to both the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces.

Will Irwin, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and author of “The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944,” told Military Times that Singlaub parachuted behind German lines in Southern France as part of the OSS’ “Project Jedburgh.”

According to U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Singlaub was one of only 83 Americans selected for the program, along with 90 British, 103 French, 5 Belgian, and 5 Dutch operatives. Jedburgh operatives, working in teams no larger than four men or women, helped organize French resistance while also providing intelligence on and harassment of German lines of communication. Ultimately, Singlaub’s efforts helped Allied forces break out of Normandy during the summer of 1944.

Following the surrender of Germany in May 1945, Singlaub was transferred to the Pacific theater to continue OSS operations. On Aug. 27, 1945, Singlaub parachuted with an eight-man team onto the Chinese island of Hainan, where they rescued hundreds of Dutch and Australian prisoners of war. Following the surrender of Japan, Singlaub remained in the Pacific, continuing to report on the Chinese civil war.

In 1951, Singlaub, now a major, was again off to war in Korea. According to the Army Special Operations Forces Command Historian, From 1951-52, Singlaub served as the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea. “JACK,” as it was known, represented the first time the CIA formed its first Clandestine Services field mission. In addition to recovering downed pilots, the shadowy organization attempted to replicate aspects of the OSS mission during the Second World War. After his tour with JACK, Singlaub commanded a conventional infantry battalion in Korea, where he was awarded the Silver Star for valor.

According to Sandboxx, in 1966, Singlaub once again returned to leading unconventional warfighters when he was selected to lead the Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group.

Commonly known as MACV-SOG or simply “SOG,” Singlaub was tasked with leading an organization comprised of special operators from all military branches as they fought North Vietnamese communist guerillas in both Vietnam and neighboring countries. A significant target of SOG was the Ho Chi Minh trail. This communist supply line existed mainly outside of Vietnam, thus technically off-limits according to the rules of engagement of the day. “As Chief SOG Jack fought the bureaucracy to get close air support for SOG teams. He fought with the State Dept. to have our teams better armed in Cambodia in the early days of the operation,” John Stryker Meyer, a SOG veteran, and Green Beret, told Sandboxx News. “He always cared deeply about the men who served under him.”

Irwin echoed Meyer’s comments about Singlaub’s dedication to those he served alongside. According to Irwin, in 1988, he received a call from Singlaub regarding Singlaub’s South Vietnamese counterpart from his time in SOG. After the war, the former South Vietnamese officer had settled in Los Angeles, California, and had lost his house to a fire. “[The RVN Officer] had lost everything,” Irwin told Military Times. “And one thing he lost that he cherished was his yearbook from the Command General Staff College.” Irwin found a replacement for Singlaub, and the gesture was symbolic of the kind of person, and leader Singlaub was. “It just struck me at the time how much he valued that relationship,” Irwin said.

Singlaub’s last command in the Army was as chief of staff of U.S. Army forces in South Korea. In 1977 he was relieved from this position after publicly criticizing then-President Jimmy Carter’s proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea.

Over his career Singlaub received two Distinguished Service Medals, the Silver Star, two Legion of Merit, two Bronze Stars, the Soldier’s Medal, two Purple Hearts, two Bronze Star Medals, the Air Medal, the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge and the Army Aviation Badge.

In 2006, Singlaub was inducted into the U.S. Army Ranger Hall of Fame, and in 2007 he was made a Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment. In 2016, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) established the MG John K. Singlaub/Jedburgh Award to recognize exceptional members of the Army commando community.

Article from the Army Times

Special Forces Losing Junior Leaders

Disclaimer: This paper was written by CPT Paul Schneider, a Special Forces Commander with over 10 years of service with multiple deployments in combat, Southern Command, and Pacific Command, and, is meant to generate awareness and discussions across Special Operations as a call to action to a critical issue currently affecting the Special Operations community and culture. This is especially affecting Special Forces and can be tied to officer and leader management. I love the Regiment and want it to be successful as it is my home. There are many other issues in the Regiment, just like any other organization, but if we cannot get the leadership culture and environment right, changes will be less impactful and short lived. If you are a senior leader reading this, this paper is for you. If you are a junior NCO or an officer in SOF, this paper is for you. What it is not is an effort to write the perfect paper. The proof comes when deeply concerned leadership across the Regiment realize they cannot answer the question of why the culture is suffering or why officer and NCO retention is so low. This paper serves as a reflection of why we must push recruiting so hard because we cannot hold onto good people that are respected by their subordinates. The real proof comes when they ask their junior officers and NCOs if the issues brought up in this exposition are true and then make meaningful change.

Currently over 50% of our best and brightest Special Forces Captains are leaving the Army and the shadow of huge morale issues continues to haunt the Special Forces Regiment. Many factors are considered as to why: including intense deployment schedules, no deployment potential, stress on families, limited command opportunities once promoted, and the promise of a more lucrative civilian career. Each of those reasons have traditionally had merit, but a glaring deficiency underpinning this is a flawed system that manifests itself in how we select and promote Special Forces (SF) officers.

To become a Special Forces captain is a gamble. The qualification course to get there is one of the longest and most rigorous qualification courses that demands prospective officers to risk their entire careers in the dream of becoming a Green Beret. In the Army officer community, it is well-known that if an officer should fail in the course, they will likely not be successful by Human Resources Command (HRC) standards. Due to the tight promotion timeline for an Army officer, losing even a year in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) would place them at a distinct disadvantage amongst their peers. The officer will be extremely vulnerable by failing to have the evaluations needed to be competitive for the next grade as the officer loses that years’ worth of evaluations and would potentially need to spend additional time in another branch’s career course. Those few that do succeed and don the Beret, enter into the ranks of an elite Special Forces Regiment (Regiment). But all is not greener on the other side of the fence. A strange phenomenon is occurring at an ever-increasing rate. Over 50% of SF officers are getting out of the Regiment. Given the hardship, the risk, and defying the odds, what is compelling over half of SF officers to not just look for a way out of Special Forces, but the military as a whole? And why are enlisted Soldiers following suit? This is a question that is being asked at all levels of the Regiment as well as other Special Operations elements with a selection process.

As I observed many of my fellow Special Forces officers resign, the obvious question to me was, “Why?” What was so compelling that after just one or two years in the Regiment, just under half-way through a normal 20-year Army career, they would just quit it all? There is a large percentage of the officer population at this point in their careers that choose to get out for reasons which typically include personal and family reasons, they have been offered a better job with better benefits, or they recognize that promotion potential is low and make the decision to pursue other opportunities. My Company Commander, Battalion Commander and Group Commander have all asked the same question. However, when I engaged my fellow Captains to determine if the above were the possible reasons, it was apparent that was not the case. Additionally, when equipped with HRC data, it was even more evident that there is a more consistent factor amongst those choosing to leave the Regiment and military service.

After discussing this at great length, additional puzzling occurrences were discovered, including a Lieutenant Colonel who deferred taking Battalion Command. It turns out that it was not just Captains who were leaving the Regiment. Field grade officers, many of whom that have invested their lives and careers into the Regiment, were resigning their commission, retiring, or turning down key command positions. Majors were electing to take non-traditional career paths that would lead them back into the conventional Army which is likely to result in limited or no promotion potential in SF. Captains chose to go Warrant Officer or resign their commission rather than become a Major. Another concern also became evident as it was not officers at risk of non-promotion or choosing to leave the service for the typically stated reasons.

In the last two years, SF officers have seen a 90 percent promotion rate for those officers that participate in their respective board. During these two years, only one Most Qualified (MQ) evaluation out of their last 5 was necessary for those selected for promotion. With one of the highest promotion rates of any branch, why would any officer choose to retire or resign? In 2019, a SF HRC newsletter was released (Human Resource Command , 2019) which featured an article where more than half of the captains in the 09’, 10’, and 11’ year groups were interviewed. The data and comments contained within the article were disturbing, including a clear indictment of the Regiment. Of those 53% that responded to the survey, 47% disagreed with remaining on active duty citing “low interest in 18A MAJ jobs” as the number one reason cited, followed closely by a “frustration w/bureaucracy.” Additional individual comments that were highlighted included, “the majority of field grades above me do not impress me or inspire confidence, their risk aversion and careerism is not worthy of the SOF lineage. I do not want to be like them, and I would be embarrassed introducing them as my boss to my out-of-army friends.” “The lack of talent management in the regiment is criminal and I believe it’s driving out our best and brightest. I have seen multiple peers ripped from their teams with zero warning and sent to a school or battalion that they never wanted to go to.” “Spoken values do not match command implemented values.” (Human Resource Command, 2019, pg. 7)

One of the more intrinsic questions was “is the SF Regiment retaining your highest-quality peers for future service as SF battalion commanders and beyond?” Surprisingly, not one single respondent answered, “absolutely yes”, a mere 7% answered “probably yes”, followed by 9% that did not comment at all and 84% answered either “no” or “absolutely no” (Human Resource Command , 2019, p. 11). I was shocked that HRC published these findings, but it gave me hope that we as a community could do the honest, hard work to look introspectively and identify issues so we could address them.

While I considered whether to stay in as a YG 12 Captain going into my RA ACC Major Promotion Selection Board, I inquired with numerous peers as to why they were electing to forego the promotion board. As I heard their stories, I also talked with Officers in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and basic branches in the regular Army. They all provided consistent and similar answers. What it boiled down to was a perception that the promotion system is severely flawed, in essence, “Ducks pick ducks.” Commanders have shown a proclivity to pick and promote people like themselves. In the military, this produces an effect where officers of a certain background or type will naturally draw commonality with others of similar experiences and philosophies, resulting in their selection over other more qualified candidates. That is how a culture is shaped. Over time, a certain type of officer dominates the command structure, skewing leadership in that direction, and losing people that do not fit into that particular mold, regardless of actual skills and abilities. A 2018 Rand study on selection of Army General Officers (GOs) (Rand Corporation, 2018) found there was an overwhelming sensitivity to pick prospective GOs that had the same background as the GOs making the selections. This same practice is commonplace at all levels of the Army. While picking prospective leaders like existing leaders is not necessarily a bad thing, in SF, a no fail environment, the intensely competitive and political environment leads to what is often referred to as a “knife fight.” Those officers who desire promotion are then often faced with a difficult decision: continue in a system they know is flawed or find a way out. Many have remained in the system, planning to gain rank to make fundamental changes, but over time, the inertia of the system leads them into the quagmire, leading them to become like those officers they had despised. The current environment is highly competitive and political where few will get the chance to lead a company or later, a battalion command. MAJs only get 1 year to prove their mettle and continue on the CSL, with maybe 3-4 coming back as BCs. This perpetuates the zero-defect mentality. One misstep or mistake that they cannot control can quickly sideline 13 years of service with little opportunity to fight back. With this at the forefront of most MAJs minds, it can affect their command climate and willingness to take any risk and reduce support to their team leaders.

Sadly, this system leads to company and battalion command teams that strip away authority and the ability of Captains and Majors to accomplish everyday tasks. A Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFOD-A) commander on deployment as a Ground Force Commander, leading diverse multi-national elements in combat, has the authority to direct any asset or service member that is in the sky or on the ground with dozens of lives on the line. It is not even questioned. However, in garrison, these same leaders have reduced or no command authority. They cannot approve a leave form, perform Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) duties, command-refer a team member in need, move someone off the team when they are unsuitable, or sign a risk assessment for a range. Yet, Regular Army Captains have all of those authorities. Does that make any sense? SF Captains have all the responsibility and accountability in sensitive environments that is beyond that of their regular Army counterparts but none of the authority. In business circles, that is a well-known recipe for a toxic culture that is destined to ultimately fail. Soldiers who worked so hard to become Green Berets are made cogs in a wheel, where their intelligence, resourcefulness, discipline, and persistence is constantly stifled by a command structure of micro-management and risk aversion.

This current system also leads to underhanded actions including milking connections, spreading unfounded rumors about other leaders, and being a “yes man.” Officers with the courage to say “No” are too often left behind. The “Yes men” incorrectly perceived as team players are rewarded, while the resourceful and highly functional leaders who hold themselves, their troops, and their leaders accountable and say “no” are punished. This is reinforced by survivorship bias, a logical error that focuses its attention on the people that made it through the system, overlooking those that did not. The survivors in SF know that the system is flawed but because they made it, it becomes the model of success to be followed and mimicked by all who want to continue in this Regiment. For many officers and enlisted, this is their life, who they are, and how they feed their families. Whether they are successful or survivors, they have sacrificed much of their youth, health, time with their family, and many have had to fight in a system that they could not change by themselves. What Majors are asked to do is hellish and even if they aspire to take care of their Soldiers, their hands are tied. I was told by a Company Commander, part of the “In-Crowd” and a “duck,” that to be successful in SF you needed three things: 1) 10% Skill, 2) 39% Networking, and 3) 51% Luck/timing. Taking care of ones’ team was not even mentioned. No unit can truly succeed if leadership does not engage with Soldiers by a lack of choice or a lack of saying “no” and making time for that engagement. In any human endeavor, employee engagement is the key to success. That commander was not a “bad” person, simply a man who learned to do what the current system asked of him. That commander needed to be a “yes man” and the result was that taking good care of his Soldiers’ family time and personal needs was less of a priority as he was squarely focused on everything else the higher echelon demanded.

There is also another factor. Name plate management. Certain officers, upon showing up to group and prior to serving a day on a team, are already being groomed. They have a different standard than other lesser-known officers and senior raters and raters have their favorites whether by their choice or influenced by someone above them. They spend more time with them, providing mentorship and guidance, while minimal time is spent with lesser favored officers. Too often, the only interaction a senior rater might have with a lesser-known team leader during a whole year is just one-hour watching a team’s pre-mission training full mission profile, after which he will then decide that officer’s future with an evaluation report. There is no objective, comprehensive evaluation of an officer’s capability or potential, it ends up too often being a popularity contest, and selecting the next “duck.” Research shows that the best goal is “Mastery” or capability of the skill. That becomes a “Pass-Fail” assessment. You are either capable, or not. In mastery, everyone can win, and helping each other be successful helps everyone. It encourages genuine team cohesiveness and support. In SF, the criteria are more akin to how good of a “duck” one can be or hoping other teams do worse so yours can look better. That is not unique to the military, but human nature. But it alienates the best and brightest, where it feels like the “ass kissers” and “politicians” get the promotions, and the truly skilled and capable officers who spend time with their team, cultivating esprit-de-corps and expertise, get left out.

Many officers in my cohort who saw that they were not particularly political or did not want to pick up a knife for the fight, could not tolerate being that type of officer to become “successful.” They chose to leave the service rather than compromising their values and morals to get ahead. Officers that take care of their troops, recognizing them as their most valuable resource, feel that they do not have a home in the Regiment. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers have seen too many “successful” leaders treat their human resources like cogs in a wheel, ignoring climate surveys and feedback from their troops. What message does it send when a commander who obviously does not care for his troops, is called out in climate surveys, and nothing happens. Or worse, he is promoted and will come back to serve as your company or battalion commander. What an effective way to create resentment and unmotivated performance at all levels of the organization. Watching incompetent leaders “fail up” guts morale.

Empathy. Few people wake up each morning wanting to be a leader that no one respects or disregards taking care of his/her people. Having accurate empathy for one’s people is key to functional relationships but is not compatible with our current system. I have heard some leaders stress that some “evil” may have to be done to get to a position where you can change the culture. However, the inertia of going along with the dysfunctional values of the current system most always wins out, with the officer rationalizing why s/he let go of their original values. We become like who we associate with. The group values are much stronger influencers than one individuals. Colin Powell also discussed this phenomenon, saying that one of his greatest frustrations was realizing the authority to change things and make them better always resided at the next higher level. Those that stay will survive, perpetuate the system, and it will continue as all bureaucracies do. You must change the underlying system if you want to change the current personnel and cultural issues in the Regiment.

If the Regiment can admit it has an issue, the next question is how we fix the problem. Research is clear that employees that feel appreciated, respected, and valued enjoy their jobs, are inventive, resourceful, loyal, competent, and go above and beyond. All the “feel good” moves of mandatory fun, meaningless awards, pay raises, and other token “rewards” have little real value, and are usually held in contempt as superficial and phony ways to pretend to care about one’s troops. They may look good on paper but are actually destructive. These transparent, superficial actions do not build the relationships so critical to high performing teams. The key is building genuine relationships within SF teams, companies, battalions, groups, and the Regiment. Keys to solid relationships are things like true empathy, genuineness, and unconditional positive regard. This is shown by firm, fair, consistent, and caring interpersonal actions and leadership. These are the skills and qualities that need to be assessed, tested and evaluated. A focus on continued development of leaders with psychologists and leadership professional development is critical and should be a part of training as an on-going requirement and added to our shoot-move-communicate-first aide-PT core skills. Add “leads” in front of those core skills and develop the Mission Essential Skills Task list to implement it. Learning MDMP or how to work in the JIIM environment does not directly teach you how to evaluate and test your leadership or develop others as a deliberate skill set. An ongoing system of objective external evaluation is also necessary to evaluate mastery and cure some of the nepotism. In Ranger Regiment, the Ranger Assessment and Selection Program continues to evaluate the individual potential and leadership skills of both officers and NCOs as they progress in rank ensuring they are prepared to assume the next higher level of responsibility. This should be implemented into SF to keep us all honest and prepared. Leadership should also consider giving ODA commanders authority to actually manage their teams like their peers in the military. Micro-management that destroys ingenuity and resourcefulness needs to be stifled. Leadership works best by selecting quality people, then helping them succeed. External evaluations, mastery, and objective performance needs to be valued and captured in OERs. Truly effective leaders are servants to their people, rewarding their skills and talent. I would like to highlight the current efforts of HRC: the deferment option allows captains the opportunity to move back a year which helps give them more time on detachments and opportunities for evaluations before going into their primary zone for their Major PSB. They have started pilot programs which allow SOF officers to go to other positions in the force or VTIP to other branches. Other efforts like merit-based promotion IAW Title 10 U.S.C. Section 616(g) (3) are based on performance and not time in grade to push those chosen officers up on the promotion list. Another, the Battalion Commanders Assessment Program promises to select only those who are ready to lead a battalion. These are great initiatives but will only address a small percentage of issues and not make cultural change. None of them address the primary issue of a system that allows only a certain type of officer and leader to survive in the Regiment.

When you have dedicated your life to the Regiment and the military, it can be hard to see its flaws for what they are. The current culture and system will continue until a conscious, deliberate effort is made to empower junior leaders, have meaningful engagements, and start to value the contributions and mastery of more than just a few leaders who fought hard and sacrificed much to survive. If we all want the Regiment to succeed and truly be an organization of our finest men and women to confront the enemies of our great Nation, we owe it to ourselves to understand and confront our flaws. This problem will require leadership at all levels to confront the system they fought to succeed in. The stakes are high and if we do not get our culture and systems right, we will continue to lose its best and brightest.

Article from the Small Wars Journal

Russian and US relearning Guerilla Warfare from each other

The United States and Russia find themselves reviving Cold War tactics when it comes to using or defeating guerilla warfare. The Soviet Union, and communist movements it sponsored around the world for over half a century, adapted ancient irregular warfare to 20th century technology and politics. The Western World War II Allies, especially the U.S., and Britain, developed successful techniques to foster and support resistance movements in areas occupied by the Germans or Japanese.

Russia was a special case because it had to operate both in support of guerillas and in suppressing them. About half the population of the Soviet Union preferred to be independent and during the Cold War Russia did not publicize its internal counter-insurgency operations as much as they did successful World War II and post-World War II insurgent operations. Some of the World War II era Soviet insurgents were not just hostile to the Germans but also to the Soviet forces. After World War II Russia found itself successfully using insurgent operations to impose communist government in East European nations where they had chased the Germans out of at the end of the war. Inside the Soviet Union there were anti-communist insurgents seeking to expel the Russians in places like Ukraine, where the Russia was still fighting the Ukrainian insurgents into the 1950s.

At the same time the U.S. Army created its Special Forces in the 1950s, to revive anti-communist insurgent operations in areas occupied or threated by Russian or communist forces. The U.S. had a long tradition of winning and defeating insurgent operations, including post-World War II communist ones.

The United States freed itself from the British Empire with one of the first modern insurgent operations. The British American colonies contained an unusually (for the time) literate and well-armed rural population. Before the revolution the British tolerated and often encouraged local militias to share the cost of defending their American colonies against local and European threats. During the revolution the American insurgents started small, driving British forces and officials out of most colonies. The various rebellious colonies united and formed a regular army. This force was not meant to defeat British troops in conventional battles, but to exist as a threat while American insurgents made life difficult for the British and German mercenary troops who were better trained and equipped for conventional warfare but were confined to urban areas by the numerous insurgents and the threat from the rebel army led by George Washington, a former militia commander who had campaigned alongside British regulars. Washington understood that his main job was to keep his army intact so it could threaten British forces who would otherwise defeat the insurgents one area at a time. The rebels sent skilled emissaries to Europe to cultivate foreign support for the rebellion. That succeeded in bringing French ground and naval forces, seeking revenge against the British more than independence for the American colonists. The French understood that the rebels were too strong for the French forces to usurp and turn the British colonies into French colonies. The French did appreciate the failed American rebel efforts to extend their rebellion to the former French colony (Quebec) in Canada. French forces returned to France just in time to get involved in the French Revolution, usually as rebels with practical experience in carrying out a successful rebellion.

Before and after World War II American forces successfully defeated over a dozen major insurgencies. There were some insurgencies that succeeded despite American intervention and those provided confirmation that under certain circumstances insurgencies succeed or fail more because of the presence of foreign intervention (with weapons and other supplies, not troops) than the determination of the rebels.

This brings us to the 2020s where American and Russian Special Forces are confronting each other in several regions, especially Eastern Europe (Ukraine) and the Middle East (Syria). The Russians are trying to suppress another Ukrainian insurgency, which succeeded in 1991 with an independent Ukraine. Since 2000 the Russian government has been dominated by former Cold War era KGB officers who consider the demise of the Soviet Union a tragic loss for mankind and are trying to repair that damage. In 2014 the Russians used their well-tested insurgency techniques to take one Ukrainian province (Crimea) and half of two other provinces in Eastern Ukraine. The Russians were hoping for a collapse of Ukrainian morale, which would allow the Russians to seize all of Ukraine. This turned out to be overly optimistic as the Ukrainians had more resolve, and foreign assistance, than during their failed insurgencies of the 1940s and 50s. One of the primary reasons for going after Ukraine was to prevent this former key component of the Soviet Union from joining NATO, as many other new nations created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist controlled nations in East Europe by 1991 had already done.

In Syria the Russian Special Forces (or Spetsnaz) succeeded in keeping the Assad government alive, despite a seemingly overwhelming rebel threat in 2011. Russia Special Forces and diplomacy saved the Assad government and left Russia with a long-term lease for a naval base and military air base on the Syrian Mediterranean coast. There were also profitable economic opportunities. The Russian special operations troops also confronted their American counterparts and found the U.S. forces more formidable than expected. The American Special Forces also noted that the new Russian Special Forces were quite capable, having learned from earlier defeats in the 1990s. There are also Russian and American Special Forces in Ukraine, more to evaluate each other than to fight.

The Americans consider the current Russian Special Forces as “competitive” with their Western equivalents and a more serious threat than during the Cold War. Both Russia and the Americans have also noted that China has developed competent, and sometimes world class, Special Forces and counter-insurgency capabilities. There are other new players from places like Iran, Israel and Turkey. The Israelis were long noted for their skills in insurgency operations, but they rarely operated far from Israel. Iran has, via its Quds Force, become active, and often successful, throughout the Middle East as well as distant areas like Venezuela and other parts of South America.

Both Russia and the United States have made greater use of armed military contractors. The armed contractors are usually military veterans, often with special operations experience. Both Russia and the Americans hire or support armed locals to sustain their insurgent or counter-insurgent operations. For example, Americans continue to work with autonomous Kurds in northern Iraq and neighboring northeast Syria. In return for sustaining Kurdish autonomy, the Kurds became a key element in defeating Islamic terrorists in general and ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in particular in both countries. The Russians use Syrian Arab mercenaries in Syria and Libya.

Irregular warfare operations are still fundamentally the same as they were a century ago but the major practitioners have also adapted to new technology and opportunities. Russia has had a hard time keeping up with the competition. The U.S., especially after it united all the special operations troops into one command (SOCOM or Special Operations Command) in the 1980s, was able to find and take advantage of new technology and still attract enough qualified volunteers for the exacting training and challenges encountered after the Cold War ended in 1991.

The low point for Russian special operations troops was 1999-2004, during the height of the Second Chechen War. Spetsnaz and airborne troops suffered major reversals and defeats at the hands of Chechen guerrilla fighters, with an entire company of supposedly "elite" paratroopers being wiped out during one infamous battle. The most embarrassing moment for Russia's elite was the 2002 Moscow theater siege and the 2004 Beslan school siege. During the former, Spetsnaz troops, instead of executing a well-planned attack on the hostage-takers, bungled the rescue operation resulting in the deaths of hundreds of hostages along with all the terrorists. During the Beslan incident Russian special forces conducted a conventional-style assault on the building, including the reckless use of rocket launchers with incendiary warheads, tanks, and RPG-7V1s to blast their way into the school. Both incidents not only damaged Russia's reputation abroad, as it was seen as callously disregarding the lives of its own citizens, but also the reputation of the country's best soldiers.

After Beslan, Spetsnaz leaders decided to set things right and by 2014 the improvements were obvious. For example, Russians know that their elite forces are the most effective, reliable troops they have and can't afford to have them spread thinly across the military in different formations. Instead the Russians concentrated their most effective troops into specific units and proved the resources for these few units to train and be equipped for immediate use.

One of the more public examples of this was seen in 2008 when a Spetsnaz reconnaissance battalion led the Russian invasion of Georgia in the Caucasus and displayed a high degree of skill and ability. Spetsnaz soldiers obviously had a lot of new equipment, as they could be seen employing a wide variety of specially developed small arms and light weapons.

Russia has several different special operations, or “Spetsnaz” organizations and most are of recent origin. After World War II it took the Soviet Union a while to note the success of U.S. and American commandos and attempt to emulate their success. In the 1960s, the Red Army began to organize "troops of special purpose" ("Spetsialnoye nazranie", or Spetsnaz for short) units. The Soviet Union had always had some form of commandos but they were special units of the secret police (KGB). For special operations the army would form temporary units consisting entirely of officers.

The original Spetsnaz were organized more like a massive use of commando teams. A Spetsnaz brigade of 1,300 men could field about 100 8-10-man teams. A Spetsnaz company had 135 men further divided into 15 independent teams. The actual organization of these brigades was four parachute battalions, an assassin company, a headquarters, and support troops (mainly communications). A naval Spetsnaz brigade had two battalions of "combat swimmers" comparable to U.S. SEALs, a parachute battalion, a midget submarine company, and other units the army Spetsnaz brigades had. There were also many independent Spetsnaz companies assigned to armies or smaller units.

In wartime each team would be given an objective to destroy deep inside enemy territory. Or, if not to destroy something, to go deep and find out what was happening in the enemy rear. Put simply, the job of the Spetsnaz was reconnaissance and sabotage. The Spetsnaz teams would get to the target by parachute, ship, submarine, or as "tourists" before the war began. At the height of the Cold War the Soviet Union had about 30,000 Spetsnaz in service.

There was one flaw with this system: most of the Spetsnaz troopers have long been conscripts, in the army for two years. The Russians made this work by being selective in who they accepted from the conscripts who volunteered for the Spetsnaz and putting the recruits through a rigorous, and violent, training program. You could think of the Soviet era Spetsnaz as paratroopers with additional training in demolitions, infiltration and reconnaissance techniques, along with foreign language training, which many Russian conscripts achieved sufficient fluency in high school. Perhaps most importantly, the Spetsnaz recruits were taught to think for themselves. This was a rare directive in the Soviet (or Russian) armed forces. But for commandos to be effective they had to think independently, and the Soviets realized this when they set up the Spetsnaz and the Spetsnaz training program.

During the Soviet period the Spetsnaz were seen as an elite organization and a career enhancing thing to have on one's resume. The Spetsnaz had more volunteers than it needed and would often take the top graduates from other selective training programs. A favorite method was to send Spetsnaz applicants to the six-month NCO course, which had a high wash out rate. Those who made it through were competent leaders and just the kind of people the Spetsnaz needed. Even after the Soviet Union fell the Spetsnaz were still seen as elite. It did not go unnoticed that Spetsnaz veterans were always in demand as well-paid bodyguards and security experts.

The Soviets knew they were getting a lot of eager, motivated, and not thoroughly trained Spetsnaz troopers. But they had so many of them that it was felt enough of them would do enough damage to make it all worthwhile. We'll never know if the original plan would have worked, but the Spetsnaz were effective during the 1980s Afghanistan war. The main reason wasn't the superior Spetsnaz combat skills but their initiative and ability to think for themselves. The Afghans facing them noted this and learned to clear out of any area where Spetsnaz were operating in.

The Spetsnaz recognized the need for career troops for some jobs. The assassin company in each Spetsnaz brigade was staffed with 70-80 career soldiers, whose job was to find, identify, and kill key enemy political and military leaders.

When the Soviet Union fell in 1991 the Spetsnaz didn't disappear. The new nations formed from parts of the Soviet Union inherited any Spetsnaz units stationed in their territory. Many of these non-Russian Spetsnaz still exist, although most are not of the same quality as they were when the Soviet Union still existed. Although there are fewer Spetsnaz today there are still about 10,000 of them in Russian service. And most of them are career soldiers. Currently more than half are careerists, versus 20-30 percent during the Soviet period. Eventually all Spetsnaz will be volunteers because conscription is fading away in Russia. Many of the current Spetsnaz are specialists, with specific skills needed for underwater operations (like U.S. SEALs) and anti-terrorist operations (like the U.S. Delta Force). The post-Soviet Union Russian government maintained the strength of their commandos because they knew they would need some skilled and dependable troops for emergencies.

The Spetsnaz selection and training methods were used to create commando units in the FSB (the successor of the KGB), the Interior Ministry (the national police), and various other paramilitary organizations. But most (about two-thirds) of the 15,000 Spetsnaz troops are in the ten army Spetsnaz Brigades.

Russia had much less money for its special operations forces after 1991 and had to buy as much of the new Western gear as they could. The Russian defense industries rapidly declined in the 1990s as did the number of qualified personnel available. Rebuilding took over a decade and fundamental reforms were necessary to create the current force. Russia still has an edge with its less restrictive ROE (Rules of Engagement) than the Americans. The current Spetsnaz also suffers from less popular support. Too many Spetsnaz combat deaths, especially outside Russia, is a major problem. Russia gets around this by using more expensive military contractors for the most dangerous jobs. When a lot of contractors get killed there is less of a problem with public opinion back in Russia. After all, the military contractors are not officially soldiers and get paid more to face such risks. After 1991 the Russian military found they had an image problem that the average Russian could now openly express in many ways. Evading conscription became more acceptable and lower post-1991 birth rates among a Russian population that was half the size of the Soviet Union’s added to the problem. The desired all-volunteer force is indefinitely delayed and few military contractors can be hired because the money is not there.

SOCOM has five times as many personnel as all Russian special operations forces combined, and all the Americans are career volunteers. SOCOM personnel encountering their Russian counterparts in Ukraine and several foreign areas found that the Russians are still formidable, but a long way from meeting Western standards. This is one reason Russia wants to keep Ukraine out of NATO, because joining NATO and the EU means meeting Western military standards and access to Western economies to spur economic growth. Keeping Ukraine out of NATO is what the Russians are after and the Russian leader, a former KGB officer, has been increasingly aggressive with his demands, but no longer threatening nuclear war over it. Earlier nuclear threats did not go over well in Russia, where public opinion is even more important than during the Soviet period. Even Stain quietly tracked public opinion and when the secret KGB reports on that opinion revealed problems, Stalin quietly adjusted his methods to calm the population. The Soviet Union eventually collapsed because too many Russians refused to believe, or obey, their government. Some things never change, even if they are state secrets.

Article from the Strategy Page

Rest in Peace LTC Bob Chisolm

LTC (retired) Robert E. "Bob" Chisolm of the Benavidez-Patterson All Airborne Chapter passed away 4 January 2022. Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Chisolm was a World War II veteran of two combat jumps into Normandy (D Day) and Holland (Operation Market Garden) as well as saw combat in the Battle of the Bulge. He later served in combat in Korea then again in Vietnam earning the Combat Infantryman Badge (3rd Award). He was wounded in all 3 wars.

Bob, born on 3 June 1925 in Dallas, Texas was awarded the French Legion of Honor for his role in the Normandy invasion. His other awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts.

In Your Honor

Unselfishly, you left your fathers and your mothers,

You left behind your sisters and your brothers.

Leaving your beloved children and wives,

You put on hold, your dreams-your lives.

On foreign soil, you found yourself planted

To fight for those whose freedom you granted.

Without your sacrifice, their cause would be lost

But you carried onward, no matter the cost.

Many horrors you had endured and seen.

Many faces had haunted your dreams.

You cheered as your enemies littered the ground;

You cried as your brothers fell all around.

When it was over, you all came back home,

Some were left with memories to face all alone;

Some found themselves in the company of friends

As their crosses cast shadows across the land.

Those who survived were forever scarred

Emotionally, physically, permanently marred.

Those who did not now sleep eternally

'Neath the ground they had given their lives to keep free.

With a hand upon my heart, I feel The pride and respect;

my reverence is revealed

In the tears that now stream down my upturned face

As our flag waves above you, in her glory and grace.

Freedom was the gift that you unselfishly gave

Pain and death was the price that you ultimately paid.

Every day, I give my utmost admiration

To those who had fought to defend our nation

Three Soldiers presented with Medals of Honor

On Thursday 16 December 2021 three soldiers were presented Medals of Honor, the nation’s highest military award for valor in combat, who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two were recognized posthumously.

Those honored were:

Master Sgt. Earl Plumlee, a Special Forces soldier who fought off Taliban insurgents after an attack in Afghanistan in 2013.
Sgt. 1st Class Christopher Celiz, 32, an Army Ranger who died after stepping between Taliban fighters and a U.S. helicopter evacuating wounded in 2018 in Afghanistan.
Sgt. 1st Class Alwyn Cashe, 35, who died as a result of burns he suffered while rescuing fellow soldiers from a burning vehicle in Iraq in 2005.
Kate Celiz and Tamara Cashe accepted the medals of behalf of their families.

Photo above: Cashe (left); Celiz (middle); and Plumlee (right)

Cashe is the first Black service member to receive the Medal of Honor for military actions since Vietnam, according to the White House. He was on patrol in Iraq in October 2005 when the Bradley Fighting Vehicle he was commanding was attacked with small arms fire and a roadside bomb. Cashe repeatedly returned to the burning vehicle and pulled six soldiers from the wreckage. Despite his burns, Cashe refused to board the medical evacuation helicopter until the other soldiers were evacuated first. Cashe, who grew up in Oviedo, Florida, died of his burn injuries at a Texas hospital the following month. Three of the soldiers he pulled from the flaming vehicle also died.

Celiz was leading an operation to clear an area of enemy forces in Afghanistan in 2018 when his team came under attack. He used his body to shield his unit from enemy fire as a casualty was loaded on to a medical evacuation helicopter. Celiz stayed behind to cover the aircraft. As the helicopter lifted off, Celiz positioned himself to shield the cockpit. He was hit by enemy fire. Despite his injuries, he motioned to the aircraft to depart rather than remain to load him at the risk of further casualties. Celiz was a South Carolina native and had enlisted in the Army in 2006.

Plumlee, was serving at a base in Afghanistan when it came under attack, with insurgents blowing a 60-foot breach in the perimeter wall. Ten insurgents wearing Afghan National Army uniforms and suicide vests poured through. Plumlee and five other soldiers drove toward the explosion to head off the attack. Armed with just a pistol, Plumlee killed two insurgents and engaged several others at close range, despite heavy enemy fire and his own injuries. At one point, Plumlee ran to a wounded soldier, carried him to safety and rendered first aid. Plumlee is currently serving with the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Article from the Military Times